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THE IMAGE AND THE REALITY:
THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
DAVID BARTON*
Thomas Jefferson had a significant impact on America,
American government, and American culture, and his influence
continues today. His words help shape policies on everything
from the scope and limits of the federal government to the
growth and development of scientific inquiry. His most recogniz-
able current role is as a singular authority on religion in the pub-
lic square.
JEFFERSON AND THE SUPREME COURT
In 1947 in Everson v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court
acknowledged Thomas Jefferson as an authority on the First
Amendment's religion clauses:
This Court has previously recognized that the provisions of
the First Amendment, in the drafting and adoption of
which . . .Jefferson played such [a] leading role[ ] . .. .
Having recognized Jefferson as an authority on religion in
the Constitution, the Court announced the single Jefferson
phrase (from among his more than sixty volumes of writings)
that would become its canon for the First Amendment:
* David Barton is a consultant to state and federal legislators and has
been involved in several federal court cases, including at the U.S. Supreme
Court. He personally owns thousands of original documents from the Founding
Era, including handwritten documents of the signers of the Declaration of
Independence and the Constitution. Barton has been appointed by State Edu-
cational Boards in California, Texas, and other states to help write the history
and government standards for students in those states. He has served as an
editor for national publishers of school history textbooks. Barton is the recipi-
ent of several national and international awards, including the Daughters of the
American Revolution Medal of Honor, the George Washington Honor Medal,
Who's Who in America (1999, 1997), Who's Who in the World (1999, 1996),
Who's Who in American Education (1997, 1996), International Who's Who of
Professionals (1996), Two Thousand Notable American Men Hall of Fame
(1995), Who's Who Among Outstanding Americans (1994), Who's Who in the
South and Southwest (2001, 1999, 1995), Outstanding Young Men in America
(1990), and numerous other awards. He is the author of numerous books and
holds a B.A. from Oral Roberts University and an Honorary Doctorate of Let-
ters from Pensacola Christian College.
1. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 13 (1947).
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In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment
of religion by law was intended to erect "a wall of separa-
tion between Church and State."
2
Using Jefferson's metaphor, the Court announced:
The First Amendment has erected a wall between church
and state. That wall must be kept high and impregnable.
We could not approve the slightest breach.3
Subsequent to Everson, the Supreme Court constructed
three additional religion tests it believed to be inconsequential
variations on Jefferson's metaphor. Based on Jefferson's author-
ity the government cannot establish religion (Establishment Test,
1947),' or permit a religious activity unless its purpose is prima-
rily secular and its implementation excludes the civil sector
(Lemon Test, 1971).' Additionally, if a government entity allows
a public religious activity, that activity will be unconstitutional if it
appears that the government is "endorsing" religion (Endorse-
ment Test, 1984) .6 Finally, if a single individual is uncomfortable
in the presence of a public religious activity and is placed "in the
dilemma of participating . . . or protesting, ' 7 then that religious
activity is unconstitutional (Psychological Coercion Test, 1992).8
Each test has been progressively more restrictive, resulting in a
growing and permanent displacement of religion from the pub-
lic square.
Since and including its 1947 Everson pronouncement, the
Court has rendered forty-four Establishment Clause decisions.9
Of those forty-four cases, Jefferson was cited authoritatively in six-
teen cases1 ° with his "wall of separation between Church and
2. Id. at 16 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)).
3. Id. at 18.
4. See generally id.
5. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
6. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984) (O'ConnorJ., concur-
ring). Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Lynch was adopted by a major-
ity of the Court in County of Allegheny v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S. 573
(1989).
7. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 593 (1992).
8. Id. at 638 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
9. These are cases brought before the Court under, or decided on the
basis of, the Establishment Clause.
10. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460 (Souter, J., dissenting)
(Stevens,J., dissenting); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 873 (2000) (Souter,J.,
dissenting); Lee, 505 U.S. at 600-01 (Blackmun,J., concurring); Lynch, 465 U.S.
at 673; Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 802 (1983); Larkin v. Grendel's Den,
Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 122-23 (1982); Comm. for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S.
756, 760-61, 771 (1973); Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 684-85
(1970) (Brennan, J., concurring); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 106
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State" metaphor (or some slight modification thereof) cited in
an additional eight cases.1 Of the remaining twenty cases,' 2 all
of them relied on a case in which Jefferson had been invoked as a
primary authority in reaching the decision. There was no Estab-
lishment Clause decision which did not refer to Jefferson, his
metaphor, or a case relying on him. Therefore, Jefferson was
invoked as an authority, either directly or indirectly, in one hun-
dred percent of Establishment Clause cases.'
(1968); Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 251 (1968) (Black, J., dissenting);
Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 234-35 (1963) (Brennan,J., con-
curring); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 493 (1961); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S.
421, 425 (1962); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 443 (1961); State ex rel.
McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 211-12 (1948); Everson v. Bd. of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 13, 16 (1947).
11. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 323 (2000) (Rehn-
quist, C.J., dissenting); Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S. at 650-51 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part), 657-58 (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 617-18 (1988);
Comm. for Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 671 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 236, 257 (1977) (Brennan,J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part); Roemer v. Md. Pub. Works Bd., 426 U.S. 736,
768 (1976); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613-14 (1971); Zorach v. Clau-
son, 343 U.S. 306, 317 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting).
12. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997); Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel
Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994); Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock,
489 U.S. 1 (1989); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987); Aguilar v. Felton,
473 U.S. 402 (1985); Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985);
Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc. 472 U.S. 703 (1985); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472
U.S. 38 (1985); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983); Larson v. Valente, 456
U.S. 228 (1982); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980); Meek v. Pittenger, 421
U.S. 349 (1975); Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973); Hunt v. McNair, 413
U.S. 734 (1973); Levitt v. Comm. for Pub. Educ., 413 U.S. 472 (1973); Norwood
v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973); Lemon, 411 U.S. 192; Tilton v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 672 (1971); Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Mkt. of Mass., 366 U.S. 617 (1961);
Two Guys, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961).
13. While the forty-four cases noted above were brought under or
decided on the basis of the Establishment Clause, there are a number of other
cases not brought before the Court on that basis but which nevertheless contain
a lengthy exegesis on the Establishment Clause. In virtually every one of these
additional cases, the Court follows its pattern of invoking Jefferson, his meta-
phor, or a previous case in which Jefferson had been a primary authority.
Therefore, even if these cases were added to the fourty-four listed above, the
one-hundred percent rate would essentially remain unchanged. Other cases
with a discussion of the Establishment Clause include:
(1) Free Exercise/Free Speech cases. See, e.g., Good News Club v.
Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001); Rosenberger v. Univ. of Va.,
515 U.S. 819 (1995); Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette,
515 U.S. 753 (1995); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1
(1993); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508
U.S. 384 (1993); Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496
U.S. 226 (1990); Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474
2003]
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Not surprisingly, federal courts of appeals have followed the
Supreme Court's use of Jefferson, citing him authoritatively or
invoking his metaphor in dozens of cases in the past half cen-
tury.14 Additionally, there are scores of similar citations by fed-
eral district courts. Because of the "'selective incorporation' . . .
of the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment," 5 even
State courts rely heavily on Jefferson.
1 6
Consequently, courts have assembled a tight package of now
predictable Jefferson quotes and activities on which they rely to
sanction policy decisions made in his name. Yet there are vast
numbers of Jefferson quotes and actions which, should they be
considered seriously by the Court, would cause at least a serious
reassessment of its landmark Establishment Clause rulings and
quite probably a dramatic reversal.
U.S. 481 (1986); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); McDaniel v.
Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978).
(2) Tax-exemption/tax-sales cases. See, e.g., Jimmy Swaggart Minis-
tries v. Bd. of Equalization of Cal., 493 U.S. 378 (1990); Hernandez v.
Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 490 U.S. 680 (1989).
(3) Labor issue cases. See, e.g., Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos,
483 U.S. 327 (1987).
(4) Conscientious objector cases. See, e.g., Gillette v. United States,
401 U.S. 437 (1971).
(5) Cases involving standing. See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian Coll. v.
Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464 (1982);
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
14. A search revealed a minimum of forty cases, representing all federal
circuits. See, e.g., ACLU v. Capitol Square Review, 243 F.3d 289, 295-96 (6th
Cir. 2001); Chandler v. James, 180 F.3d 1254,1259 (11th Cir. 1999); Strout v.
Albanese, 178 F.3d 57, 61, 64 (1st Cir. 1999); Helms v. Picard, 151 F.3d 347,
363, 375 (5th Cir. 1998); ACLU v. Black Horse Pike Reg'l Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d
1471, 1481 (3d Cir. 1996); Cammack v. Waihee, 944 F.2d 466, 472 (9th Cir.
1991) (Pregerson,J., dissenting); Am. Jewish Cong. v. City of Chicago, 827 F.2d
120, 124 (7th Cir. 1987); Donovan v. Tony and Susan Alamo Found., 722 F.2d
397, 402 (8th Cir. 1983); Lanner v. Wimmer, 662 F.2d 1349, 1351-53 (10th Cir.
1981); Brandon v. Bd. of Educ., 635 F.2d 971, 973-74 (2d Cir. 1980); United
States v. Snider, 502 F.2d 645, 664 (4th Cir. 1974) (Widener, J., dissenting).
15. Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 701-02 (1970) (Douglas,
J., dissenting).
16. A search revealed a minimum of fifty-eight cases, including state
supreme court cases. See, e.g., State ex rel. James v. ACLU of Ala., 711 So. 2d 952,
965-66 (Ala. 1998) (Maddox, J., concurring); Bd. of Educ. v. Bakalis, 299
N.E.2d 737, 740-41 (Ill. 1973); Farris v. Minit Mart Foods, 684 S.W.2d 845, 847
(Ky. 1984); Ams. United for the Separation of Church and State v. Indep. Sch.
Dist. No. 622, 179 N.W.2d 146, 152-53 (Minn. 1970); Ams. United for the Sepa-
ration of Church and State v. Rogers, 538 S.W.2d 711, 722 (Mo. 1976); Guinn v.
Church of Christ of Collinsville, 775 P.2d 766, 770 (Okla. 1989); Chittenden
Town Sch. Dist. v. Dep't of Educ., 738 A.2d 539, 556 (Vt. 1999); Backlund v. Bd.
of Comm'rs, 724 P.2d 981, 987 (Wash. 1986).
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This is not to imply that Jefferson was a fervent religionist;
he was not. Neither does it follow, however, that he was an
ardent secularist. Jefferson's religious views and activities are
documented at length; his writings on religion are prolific and at
times even self-contradictory. In fact, his statements about relig-
ion are such that opposing positions can each invoke Jefferson as
its authority.
Regardless of one's personal predilections about Jefferson
and religion, there are significant but little known historical facts
from his written words and documented actions on religion in
the public square. History will show that most if not all of Jeffer-
son's actions abysmally fail each of the four religious tests the
contemporary Court has erected in his name.
JEFFERSON'S PRESIDENTIAL ACTIONS REGARDING
RELIGIOUS ExPRESsION
In 1800, when Washington, D.C., became the national capi-
tal and the President moved into the White House and Congress
into the Capitol, Congress approved the use of the Capitol build-
ing as a church building for Christian worship services.' 7 It was
in this most recognizable of all government buildings-the Capi-
tol-that President Jefferson attended church each Sunday."8
President Jefferson even sanctioned paid government musicians
assisting in the worship at those church services.' 9 He also
effected similar Christian worship services on Sunday in his own
Executive Branch, both at the Treasury Building and at the War
Office.2 °
John Quincy Adams, a U.S. Senator during the Jefferson
administration, made frequent references to these services. Typi-
cal of his almost weekly journal entries are these:
[R]eligious service is usually performed on Sundays at the
Treasury office and at the Capitol. I went both forenoon
and afternoon to the Treasury .... 21
Attended public service at the Capitol, where Mr. Ratoon,
an Episcopalian clergyman from Baltimore, preached a
sermon. 22
17. 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 797 (1800).
18. THE FIRST FORTY YEARS OF WASHINGTON SOCIETY 13 (Gaillard Hunt
ed., 1906); see alsoJAMES HUTSON, RELIGION AND THE FOUNDING OF THE AMERI-
CAN REPUBLIC 84 (1998).
19. HUTSON, supra note 18, at 89.
20. Id. at 89; see also I JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY
ADAMs 265 (Charles Francis Adams ed., Phila., J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1874).
21. 1 ADAMs, supra note 20, at 265.
22. Id. at 268 (Oct. 30, 1803).
2003]
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The Rev. Manasseh Cutler, a U.S. Congressman during the
Jefferson administration (as well as a chaplain in the Revolution
and a physician and scientist) similarly recorded in 1804:
December 23, Sunday. Attended worship at the Treasury. Mr.
[James] Laurie [pastor of the Presbyterian Church] alone
[preached]. Sacrament [communion]. Full assembly.
Three tables; service very solemn; nearly four hours. Cold
day.
23
By 1867, the church in the Capitol had become the largest
church in Washington, and the largest Protestant church in
America.24
These activities in federal buildings that Jefferson
encouraged and in which he participated would fail all four of
the tests erected by the Court under his authority.
In 1801, President Jefferson urged local governments to
make land available specifically for Christian purposes25-a clear
violation of the Lemon, Establishment, and Endorsement tests.
In an 1803 federal Indian treaty, President Jefferson pro-
vided $300 to "assist the said Kaskaskia tribe in the erection of a
church" and to provide "annually for seven years $100 towards
the support of a Catholic priest. "26 He also signed three separate
acts setting aside government lands for the sole use of religious
groups so that Moravian missionaries might be assisted in "pro-
moting Christianity '-a clear violation of all four of the Court's
tests.
In 1804, President Jefferson assured a Christian religious
school in the newly purchased Louisiana Territory that it would
23. 2 WILLIAM PARKER CUTLER & JULIA PERKINS CUTLER, LIFE, JOURNALS,
AND CORRESPONDENCE OF REV. MANASSEH CUTLER, LL.D. 174 (Cincinnati, Rob-
ert Clarke & Co. 1888).
24. HUTSON, supra note 18, at 91.
25. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Bishop Carroll (Sept. 3, 1801) (on
file with the Library of Congress, #19,966).
26. 4 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: DOCUMENTS, LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE
OF THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 687 (Walter Lowrie & Matthew St.
Claire Clarke eds., D.C., Gales & Seaton 1832).
27. 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 1,332 (1802) ("An Act in addition to an act, enti-
fled 'An act in addition to an act regulating the grants of land appropriated for
military services, and for the Society of the United Brethren for propagating the
Gospel among the Heathen'"); 12 ANNALS OF CONG. 1,602 (1803) ("An Act to
revive and continue in force an act, in addition to an act, Entitled 'An act in
addition to an act regulating the grants of land appropriated to military ser-
vices, and for the Society of the United Brethren for propagating the Gospel
among the Heathen,' and for other purposes."); 12 ANNALS OF CONG. 1,279
(1804) ("An Act Granting Further Time for Locating Military Land Warrants,
and for Other Purposes").
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receive "the patronage of the government";2' he even closed
presidential documents with the appellation, "In the year of our
Lord Christ"29 (see inset).
Why would President Jefferson be so overfly encouraging of
Christianity? As he explained to a friend while walking to church
together:
No nation has ever existed or been governed without relig-
ion. Nor can be. The Christian religion is the best religion
that has been given to man and I, as Chief Magistrate of
this nation, am bound to give it the sanction of my
example.30
Significantly, Jefferson's own actions as President miserably
fail every religious test contemporary courts have erected in his
name, demonstrating that Jefferson would not sanction those
tests.
JEFFERSON'S REFUSAL TO ISSUE NATIONAL
PRAYER PROCLAMATIONS
One action cited to counteract such overwhelming evidence
is President Jefferson's refusal to proclaim national days of
prayer. As Justices Brennan and Marshall noted in Marsh v.
Chambers-
Thomas Jefferson . .. during [his] respective [term] as
President.... refused on Establishment Clause grounds to
declare national days of thanksgiving or fasting.
31
Justice Kennedy similarly noted in Allegheny v. ACLU
28. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Nuns of the Order of St. Ursula
at New Orleans (May 15, 1804) (original on file with the New Orleans Parish).
29. See, for example, his Presidential Act of October 18, 1804 (on file
with author).
30. HtrrsoN, supra note 18, at 96 (from a handwritten history on file with
the Library of Congress, "Washington Parish, Washington City," by Rev. Ethan
Allen).
31. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 807 (1983) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
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In keeping with his strict views of the degree of separation
mandated by the Establishment Clause, Thomas Jefferson
declined to follow this tradition [of issuing national
proclamations] .32
Yet Jefferson stated that he refused to issue such proclama-
tions not because of scruples about religion in the public square
but rather because of separation of powers:
It is only proposed that I should recommend not prescribe
a day of fasting and prayer.... I am aware that the practice
of my predecessors may be quoted. But I have ever
believed, that the example of state executives led to the
assumption of that authority by the General [federal] Gov-
ernment, without due examination, which would have dis-
covered that what might be a right in a state government,
was a violation of that right when assumed by another.
33
32. Allegheny County v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 671 n.8
(1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
33. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Miller (Jan. 23, 1808), in 4
MEMOIR, CORRESPONDENCE, AND MISCELLANIES, FROM THE PAPERS OF THOMASJEF-
FERSON 104 (Thomas Jefferson Randolph ed., Boston, Gray & Bowen 1830)
[hereinafter MEMOIR OF THOMAS JEFFERSON]. Although Jefferson refused to
issue national proclamations, he openly acknowledged that in this he differed
from his predecessors (and his successors as well). IfJefferson's standard is the
correct one, then were George Washington and John Adams acting unconstitu-
tionally in issuing their proclamations? Significantly, if Jefferson's constitu-
tional credentials are compared with those of either Washington or Adams,
Jefferson's are clearly inferior. Jefferson had no hand in the Constitution, and
according to his own account wrote only a single letter expressing his belief that
a Bill of Rights should be added to the Constitution. However, George Wash-
ington was the President of the Constitutional Convention and John Adams'
signature is one of only two that appears on the Bill of Rights. Therefore, if
there is a disagreement as to constitutional interpretation, on what basis do
Jefferson's credentials surpass those of his predecessors? And while Jefferson's
refusal to issue national prayer proclamations is cited authoritatively, ignored is
the fact thatJefferson's successor, James Madison, issued more national prayer
proclamations than any other President until George W. Bush. However, rather
than mention Madison's practices, courts instead cite Madison's Detached Memo-
randa in which he denounces such proclamations and his own practices. See,
e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 617 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring); Marsh,
463 U.S. at 791 n.12; ACLU v. Capitol Square Review, 243 F.3d 289, 296, 318
(6th Cir. 2001); O'Malley v. Brierley, 477 F.2d 785, 792-93 (3d Cir. 1973). Sig-
nificantly, the Detached Memoranda was only "discovered" in 1946 in the papers
of Madison biographer William Cabell Rives and was first published more than
a century after Madison's death by Elizabeth Fleet. Elizabeth Fleet, Madison's
"Detached Memoranda", 3 WM. & MARY Q. (n.s.) 534 (1946). In that work,
Madison expressed his opposition to many of his own earlier beliefs and prac-
tices and set forth a new set of beliefs formerly unknown even to his closest
friends. Since Madison never made public or shared with his peers his senti-
ments found in the Detached Memoranda, and since his own public actions were
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Separation of powers is generally understood in its horizon-
tal application (between the three branches of the federal gov-
ernment, or between the three branches of a State government)
rather than in its vertical usage (between the federal government
and the State governments). Jefferson understood its vertical
usage and declared his belief that the Tenth Amendment caused
national prayer proclamations to be improper:
I consider the government of the United States as inter-
dicted by the constitution from intermeddling with relig-
ious institutions, their doctrines, discipline, or exercises.
This results not only from the provision that no law shall
be made respecting the establishment, or free exercise of
religion, but from that also which reserves to the states the
powers not delegated to the United States. Certainly, no
power to prescribe any religious exercise, or to assume
authority in any religious discipline, has been delegated to
the General Government. It must then rest with the States
34
Jefferson therefore warned:
[W]hen all government, domestic and foreign, in little as
in great things, shall be drawn to Washington as the centre
of all power, it will render powerless the checks provided of one
government on another .... 5
Jefferson believed that the vertical separation of powers
between the State and federal governments was the least under-
stood aspect of our system:
With respect to our State and federal governments, I do
not think their relations correctly understood by foreign-
ers. They generally suppose the former subordinate to the
latter. But this is not the case. They are co-ordinate depart-
ments of one simple and integral whole. To the State gov-
ernments are reserved all legislation and administration, in
affairs which concern their own citizens only, and to the
federal government is given whatever concerns foreigners,
or the citizens of other States; these functions alone being
at direct variance with this later writing, it is difficult to argue that it reflects the
Founders' (plural) intent toward religion. For courts to use that writing as
authoritative is a flagrant abuse of historical records, choosing a long unknown
ex post facto document in preference to those concurrent with the framing and
implementation of the First Amendment.
34. MEMOIR Or THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 33, at 103-04 (emphasis
added).
35. Letter from ThomasJefferson to Charles Hammond (Aug. 18, 1821),
in 15 THE WRITINGS OF THOMASJEFFERSON 332 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed., 1905)
(emphasis added).
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made federal. The one is the domestic, the other the for-
eign branch of the same government; neither having con-
trol over the other, but within its own department.3 6
Thus, it was Jefferson's understanding of federalism and sep-
aration of powers that was largely behind his refusal to issue a
national prayer proclamation. Confirmation is provided by the
fact that although he refused to issue such a call as President, he
did so as a State Governor;3 7 and he also authored the State law
entitled "A bill, for appointing days of public fasting and
thanksgiving."38 Consequently, the charge that "Thomas Jeffer-
son.., refused on Establishment Clause grounds to declare national
days of thanksgiving or fasting"" is fallacious.
It is in light of Jefferson's understanding of separation of
powers that his other actions in directly promoting and aiding
Christianity may best be understood. PresidentJefferson enacted
federal treaties that directly funded Christian missionaries and
Christian church buildings for Indians, but the Constitution had
placed treaties solely within the power of the federal government
and out of State jurisdiction. President Jefferson attended, sup-
ported, and helped establish Christian worship services in federal
government buildings, therefore not intruding on any of the
States' powers. Similarly, he told religious schools in federal terri-
tories that they would receive the support and patronage of the
federal government, thus violating no State powers. And he
signed his own federal presidential documents with the appella-
tion "In the year of our Lord Christ," thus usurping no State
prerogatives.
Significantly, all of President Jefferson's religious activities at
the federal level occurred more than a decade after the First
Amendment had been adopted, thus demonstrating that he saw
no violation of the First Amendment in any of his actions. In
fact, no one did; not even his enemies raised a voice of dissent
against his federal religious practices. Furthermore, since what
Jefferson did under the First Amendment was permissible at the
36. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Major John Cartwright (June 5,
1824), in 16 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 35, at 47.
37. 2 OFFICIAL LETTERS OF THE GOVERNORS OF THE STATE OF VIRGINIA, THE
LETTERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 64-66 (H.R. McIlwaine ed., 1928) (Nov. 11,
1779); see also 1 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 35, at 9-10
(Jefferson's encouragement of a day of fasting and prayer for June 1, 1774,
when the British blockaded Boston).
38. 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 396 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds.,
1973).
39. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 807 (1983) (Brennan,J., and Mar-
shall, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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federal level, then when the Court applied the First Amendment
limitations against the States through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment,40 corresponding activities at the State level would have
remained permissible even under that Amendment.
JEFFERSON'S NON-PRESIDENTIAL ACTIONS REGARDING
RELIGIOUS ExPREssION
In addition to Jefferson's call for a statewide day of prayer as
Governor of Virginia4 he also praised the use of the Charlottes-
ville courthouse for religious services.4 2 As a State Legislator he
authored and introduced a number of bills with solely religious
content, giving legal sanction to specific religious observances.
As a Virginia delegate to the Continental Congress, Jefferson
was placed on a congressional committee to draft a governmen-
tal seal; he recommended that the seal depict a story from the
Bible and that the new government motto include the word
"God.
44
Additionally, when Thomas Jefferson authored his plan of
education, he considered religious study an inseparable part of
the study of law and political science:
[I] n my catalogue, considering ethics, as well as religion, as
supplements to law in the government of man, I had
placed them in that sequence.45
When Jefferson founded the University of Virginia, he desig-
nated space in its Rotunda for chapel services 46 and indicated
that he expected students to attend weekly divine services.4 7 He
further declared his expectation that students participate in the
various religious schools that he had invited to locate adjacent to
and upon the University property. 48 As Justice Reed explained:
40. For a description of this process, see Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New
York, 397 U.S. 664, 701 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
41. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
42. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Dr. Thomas Cooper (Nov. 2, 1822),
in 4 MEMOIR OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 33, at 358-59; letter from
ThomasJefferson to Dr. Thomas Cooper (Nov. 2, 1822), in 15 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 35, at 404.
43. 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 38, at 396.
44. 1 THE PAPERS OF THOMASJEFFERSON 494-97 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950)
(Report on a Seal for the United States, with Related Papers, Aug. 20, 1776).
45. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Judge Augustus B. Woodward (Mar.
24, 1824), in 16 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 35, at 19.
46. 19 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 35, at 449-50 ("a
meeting of the Visitors of the University . . .on Monday the 4th of October,
1824 ....").
47. Id. at 449.
48. Id. at 449-50.
2003]
410 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 17
Mr. Jefferson, as one of the founders of the University of
Virginia, a school which from its establishment in 1819 has
been wholly governed, managed and controlled by the
State of Virginia was faced with the same problem that is
before this Court today: the question of the constitution
limitation upon religious education in public schools. In
his annual report as Rector, to the President and Directors
of the Literary Fund, dated October 7, 1822, approved by
the Visitors of the University of whom Mr. Madison was
one, Mr. Jefferson set forth his views at some length. These
suggestions of Mr. Jefferson were adopted and ch. II, § 1,
of the Regulations of the University of October 4, 1824,
provided that:
"Should the religious sects of this State, or any of
them, according to the invitation held out to them
establish within, or adjacent to, the precincts of the
University, schools for instruction in the religion of
their sect, the students of the University will be free,
and expected to attend religious worship at the estab-
lishment of their respective sects, in the morning, and
in time to meet their school in the University at its
stated hour."
Thus the "wall of separation between church and state" that
Mr. Jefferson built at the University which he founded did not
exclude religious education from that school.4 9
Unfortunately much of the historical record of Thomas Jef-
ferson has been excluded from the public debate and therefore a
false impression ofJefferson and his intent has been constructed.
Neither at the State nor the federal level does Jefferson demon-
strate any proclivity toward the obsessive secularization for which
courts have used him.
THE SUPREME COURT'S MISPORTRAYAL OF JEFFERSON HISTORY
Because of the importance of history in constitutional inter-
pretation, historical accuracy is essential. As Chief Justice Rehn-
quist has noted:
It is impossible to build sound constitutional doctrine
upon a mistaken understanding of constitutional history
50
49. State ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 246-47 (1948)
(Reed, J., dissenting) (quoting 19 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 449
(Memorial ed. 1904)) (internal citations omitted).
50. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 92 (1985) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting).
THE IMAGE AND THE REAITY
A flawed view of history will lead to errant conclusions about
the intent of a clause and therefore an improper application of
its constitutional principles. In short, in constitutional interpre-
tation, bad history leads to bad public policy.
In its landmark religion cases, the Court has utilized demon-
strably egregious historical errors about Jefferson in reaching its
decisions-errors not in interpretation but in fact. Once the
Court makes an inaccurate portrayal of Jefferson history, that
erroneous representation is often cited authoritatively in subse-
quent cases, thus perpetrating and reinforcing the error. Nine
categories of the Court's factual errors will be presented below.
1. The Wrong Clause
In the landmark Everson case in 1947, the Court introduced
what has become one of its most frequently repeated passages:
In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment
of religion by law was intended to erect "a wall of separa-
tion between Church and State.'
This same Everson-citing-Reynolds passage has also been used
in McCollum v. Board of Education,5 2 McGowan v. Maryland,5 3 Tor-
caso v. Watkins, 54 Board of Education v. Allen,
55 Marsh v. Chambers,56
and Lee v. Weisman.57
It is understandable that the Everson Court should cite the
1879 Reynolds case, for it was the only Supreme Court case prior
to Everson to invoke Jefferson's "wall of separation" metaphor.
However, Reynolds-contrary to the Court's assertion-used Jef-
ferson's "wall of separation" in reference to the Free Exercise
rather than the Establishment Clause, thus pointing it toward a
completely different purpose. A review of the circumstances sur-
rounding Jefferson's writing of his "wall of separation" phrase, as
well the Court's pre-Everson use of that metaphor, is essential to
understanding how modern courts have inversed Jefferson's
intention.
The election of President Jefferson-America's first Anti-
Federalist (Republican) President-was particularly well received
by Baptists since that denomination was largely Anti-Federalist.
51. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (quoting Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)).
52. 333 U.S. at 211.
53. 366 U.S. 420, 443 (1961).
54. 367 U.S. 488, 493 (1961).
55. 392 U.S. 236, 251 (1968) (BlackJ, dissenting).
56. 463 U.S. 783, 802 (1983) (Brennan,J., dissenting).
57. 505 U.S. 577, 600-01 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
20031
412 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 17
This political disposition was understandable, for from the early
settlement of Rhode Island in the 1630s to the time of the federal
Constitution in the 1780s, the Baptists had often found their free
exercise suffering from the centralization of power, with their
ministers being beaten, imprisoned, and tyrannized.58  So
opposed were the Baptists to the centralization of power that it
was the only denomination where a majority of its clergy across
the nation voted against the ratification of the Constitution,59
and the predominately Baptist State of Rhode Island overwhelm-
ingly rejected its adoption.6 °
The election of Jefferson elated Baptists across the nation,
forJefferson had long championed the cause of Virginia Baptists
and opposed the centralized power of the State-established
Anglican Church in his State.61 Jefferson received numerous let-
ters of praise from Baptist organizations throughout his Presi-
dency,6 2 and among the first of them was that from the Danbury
Baptist Association penned on October 7, 1801. Typical of the
58. MARK A. BELILES, RELIGION AND REPUBLICANISM IN JEFFERSON'S VIR-
GINIA 31-32 (1995); SANFORD HOADLEY COBB, THE RISE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN
AMERICA 112-14, 490 (photo. reprint 1970) (1902); WILLIAM CATHCART, THE
BAPTISTS AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 12-18 (Phila., S.A. George & Co.
1876); 2 ISAAC BACKUS, A HISTORY OF NEW ENGLAND, WITH PARTICULAR REFER-
ENCE TO THE DENOMINATION OF CHRISTIANS CALLED BAPTISTS 94-95 (Newton,
Backus Historical Soc'y 1871); 1 GEORGE BANCROFT, HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 449-50 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1858).
59. See, e.g., JOHN EIDSMOE, CHRISTIANITY AND THE CONSTITUTION 353
(1987) (Of all the clergy who attended the various state ratifying conventions
for the federal Constitution, the only denomination from which the majority of
its representatives voted against the ratification of the Constitution was the Bap-
tists). Eidsmoe compiled the figures from James Hutchinson Smylie, American
Clergyman and the Constitution of the United States of America (1954)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton Theological Seminary).
60. ROBERT ALLEN RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 155
(1955) ("The Rhode Island legislature had sent the Constitution to the towns
instead of calling a convention. In the town meetings the Constitution had
been defeated, 237 yeas to 2,708 nays.").
61. 1 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 61-64 (Paul Leicester Ford ed.,
1904).
62. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Members of the Baptist
Church of Buck Mountain in Albemarle (Apr. 13, 1809), in 16 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 35, at 363-64; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to
the General Meeting of Correspondence of the Six Baptist Associations Repre-
sented at Chesterfield, Virginia (Nov. 21, 1808), in 16 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON, supra note 35, at 320-21; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the
Ketocton Baptist Association (Oct. 18, 1808), in 16 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON, supra note 35, at 319-20; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Balti-
more Baptist Association (Oct. 17, 1808), in 16 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEF-
FERSON, supra note 35, at 317-18.
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others, it expressed its gratitude to God for his election and
offered its prayers of blessing for the President:
Among the many millions in America and Europe who
rejoice in your election to office, we embrace the first
opportunity . . . to express our great satisfaction in your
appointment to the Chief Magistracy in the United States.
. . . [W]e have reason to believe that America's God has
raised you up to fill the Chair of State out of that goodwill
which he bears to the millions which you preside over. May
God strengthen you for the arduous task which Providence
and the voice of the people have called you .... And may
the Lord preserve you safe from every evil and bring you at
last to his Heavenly Kingdom through Jesus Christ our Glo-
rious Mediator.6"
63. Letter from the Danbury Baptist Association to Thomas Jefferson
(Oct. 7, 1801) (on file with the ThomasJefferson Papers Manuscript Division,
Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.).
The complete letter to Jefferson states:
The address of the Danbury Baptist Association in the State of Con-
necticut, assembled October 7, 1801.
To Thomas Jefferson, Esq., President of the United States of America
Sir,
Among the many millions in America and Europe who rejoice in your
election to office, we embrace the first opportunity which we have
enjoyed in our collective capacity, since your inauguration, to express
our great satisfaction in your appointment to the Chief Magistracy in
the United States. And though the mode of expression may be less
courtly and pompous than what many others clothe their addresses
with, we beg you, sir, to believe that none is more sincere.
Our sentiments are uniformly on the side of religious liberty: that
religion is at all times and places a matter between God and individu-
als, that no man ought to suffer in name, person, or effects on account
of his religious opinions, that the legitimate power of civil government
extends no further than to punish the man who works ill to his neigh-
bor. But sir, our constitution of government is not specific. Our
ancient charter, together with the laws made coincident therewith,
were adapted as the basis of our government at the time of our revolu-
tion. And such has been our laws and usages, and such still are, that
Religion is considered as the first object of Legislation, and therefore
what religious privileges we enjoy (as a minor part of the State) we
enjoy as favors granted, and not as inalienable rights. And these favors
we receive at the expense of such degrading acknowledgments, as are
inconsistent with the rights of freemen. It is not to be wondered at
therefore, if those who seek after power and gain, under the pretense
of government and religion, should reproach their fellow men, should
reproach their Chief Magistrate, as an enemy of religion, law, and
good order, because he will not, dares not, assume the prerogative of
Jehovah and make laws to govern the Kingdom of Christ.
Sir, we are sensible that the President of the United States is not the
National Legislator and also sensible that the national government
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However, within that letter of congratulations, the Danbury
Baptists expressed their grave concern over the threats they
believed were posed against free exercise by constitutional relig-
ion clauses:
Our sentiments are uniformly on the side of religious lib-
erty: that religion is at all times and places a matter
between God and individuals, that no man ought to suffer
in name, person, or effects on account of his religious
opinions, that the legitimate power of civil government
extends no further than to punish the man who works ill to
his neighbor. But sir, our constitution of government is not
specific. . . .Religion is considered as the first object of
legislation, and therefore what religious privileges we enjoy
(as a minor part of the State) we enjoy as favors granted,
and not as inalienable rights.64
Such constitutional acknowledgments about religion inti-
mated to the Danbury Baptists that free-exercise was a govern-
ment-given (thus an alienable) rather than a God-given (hence
inalienable) right and to this they strenuously objected. They
believed that government should interfere with public religious
expression only when someone's religious practices caused him,
as they explained, to "work ill to his neighbor."6 5
Jefferson understood their concern; it was his own. He had
frequently emphasized the inability of the government to regu-
late, restrict, or interfere with the free-exercise of religion:
cannot destroy the laws of each State, but our hopes are strong that
the sentiment of our beloved President, which have had such genial
effect already, like the radiant beams of the sun, will shine and prevail
through all these States-and all the world-until hierarchy and tyr-
anny be destroyed from the earth. Sir, when we reflect on your past
services, and see a glow of philanthropy and goodwill shining forth in
a course of more than thirty years, we have reason to believe that
America's God has raised you up to fill the Chair of State out of that
goodwill which he bears to the millions which you preside over. May
God strengthen you for the arduous task which providence and the
voice of the people have called you-to sustain and support you and
your Administration against all the predetermined opposition of those
who wish to rise to wealth and importance on the poverty and subjec-
tion of the people.
And may the Lord preserve you safe from every evil and bring you at
last to his Heavenly Kingdom through Jesus Christ our Glorious
Mediator.
Signed in behalf of the Association,




THE IMAGE AND THE REALITY
[N]o power over the freedom of religion ... [is] delegated
to the United States by the Constitution .... 66
[O]ur excellent Constitution ... has not placed our relig-
ious rights under the power of any public functionary.
I consider the government of the United States as inter-
dicted [prohibited] by the constitution from intermed-
dling with religious institutions . . . or exercises.68
In matters of religion, I have considered that its free exer-
cise is placed by the Constitution independent of the pow-
ers of the General [federal] Government.
69
Since Jefferson believed that the government was to be pow-
erless to interfere with religious expressions (i.e., the Free Exer-
cise Clause), in his reply to the Danbury Baptists on January 1,
1802, he assured them that the federal government would never
meddle with the free exercise of religion:
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely
between man and his God, that he owes account to none
other for his faith or his worship, that the legislative powers
of government reach actions only, and not opinions, I con-
template with sovereign reverence that act of the whole
American people which declared that their legislature
should "make no law respecting an establishment of relig-
ion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof," thus building
a wall of separation between Church and State. Adhering
to this expression of the supreme will of the nation in
behalf of the rights of conscience, I shall see with sincere
satisfaction the progress of those sentiments which tend to
restore to man all his natural rights, convinced he has no
natural right in opposition to his social duties.
70
66. 8 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 61, at 459 (Kentucky
Resolutions).
67. Letter from Jefferson to the Society of the Methodist Episcopal
Church at Pittsburgh, Pa. (Dec. 9, 1808), in 16 THE WRITINGS OF THOMASJEFFER-
SON, supra note 35, at 325.
68. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Rev. Samuel Millar (Jan. 23,
1808), in 4 MEMOIR OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 33, at 103-04.
69. 14 ANNALS OF CONG. 78 (1805); see also 1 JAMES D. RICHARDSON, A
COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789-1897, at
379 (D.C.,James D. Richardson ed., 1899) (Mar. 4, 1805).
70. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Danbury Baptist Association
(Jan. 1, 1802), in 16 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, supra note 35, at
281-82.
The complete letter from Jefferson reads:
Messrs. Nehemiah Dodge, Ephraim Robbins, and Stephen S. Nelson
A Committee of the Danbury Baptist Association, in the State of
Connecticut.
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Jefferson's reference to "natural rights" confirmed his belief
that religious liberties were inalienable rights, for according to
the rhetoric of that day, "natural rights" were those fights that
God Himself had guaranteed to man71-a definition confirmed
by Founding Fathers James Wilson,72 John Adams,73 John Dickin-
son,7 ' George Mason, 75 John Quincy Adams, 6 and others.
Therefore, when Jefferson assured the Baptists that by following
their "natural rights" they would violate no social duty, Jefferson
was affirming to them that the free exercise of religion was
indeed an inalienable God-given right and therefore beyond fed-
eral intrusion. Consequently it was not surprising that when the
Washington, January 1, 1802
Gentlemen,-
The affectionate sentiment of esteem and approbation which you are
so good as to express towards me, on behalf of the Danbury Baptist
Association, give me the highest satisfaction. My duties dictate a faith-
ful and zealous pursuit of the interests of my constituents, and in pro-
portion as they are persuaded of my fidelity to those duties, the
discharge of them becomes more and more pleasing.
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between
man and his God, that he owes account to none other for his faith or
his worship, that the legislative powers of government reach actions
only, and not opinions, I contemplate with sovereign reverence that
act of the whole American people which declared that their legislature
would "make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof," thus building a wall of separa-
tion between Church and State. Adhering to this expression of the
supreme will of the nation in behalf of the rights of conscience, I shall
see with sincere satisfaction the progress of those sentiments which
tend to restore to man all his natural fights, convinced he has no natu-
ral right in opposition to his social duties.
I reciprocate your kind prayers for the protection and blessing of the
common Father and Creator of man, and tender you for yourselves
and your religious association, assurances of my high respect and
esteem.
71. See, e.g., definitions by individuals such as Richard Hooker, a political
philosopher on whom the Founders relied, in I RICHARD HOOKER (1553-1603),
THE WORKS OF RICHARD HOOKER 207 (1845).
72. 2 THE WORKS OF THE HONORABLE JAMES WILSON 454 (Bird Wilson ed.,
1804).
73. John Adams, Dissertation on the Canon and Feudal Law (1765), in 3 THE
WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 449 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 1851).
74. 1 THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JOHN DICKINSON, ESQUIRE, LATE PRESI-
DENT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE, AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
111-12 (1801).
75. 1 KATE MASON ROWLAND, THE LIFE OF GEORGE MASON 244 (N.Y., G.P.
Putnam's Sons 1892).
76. JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, AN ORATION, DELIVERED BEFORE THE CINCINNATI
ASTRONOMICAL SOCIETY, ON THE OCCASION OF LAYING THE CORNER STONE OF AN
ASTRONOMICAL OBSERVATORY, ON THE 10TH OF NOVEMBER, 1843, at 14-15 (Cin-
cinnati, Shepard & Co. 1843).
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Supreme Court first invoked Jefferson's 1802 letter in the Reyn-
olds v. United States case in 1879, it was in relation to the Free
Exercise Clause.
The Reynolds case dealt with the Mormon practice of polyg-
amy in the federal territories, a practice prohibited by federal
law. To rebut any use by the Mormons of Jefferson's letter to
defend their "free exercise" from government intrusion, the
Court published his full letter to establish its context and his
meaning (unlike contemporary courts that now publish only
eight words from his letter-"a wall of separation between
Church and State"). After noting Jefferson's narrow exceptions
to the general prohibition against federal intrusion on free exer-
cise, the Court concluded:
Coming as this does from an acknowledged leader of the
advocates of the measure, it Uefferson's letter] may be
accepted almost as an authoritative declaration of the
scope and effect of the amendment thus secured. Congress
was deprived of all legislative power over mere [religious]
opinion, but was left free to reach actions which were in
violation of social duties or subversive of good order.
77
That Court then quoted from Jefferson's Virginia Statute to
establish further his intent:
'[T]he rightful purposes of civil government [are] for its
officers to interfere when principles break out into overt
acts against peace and good order.' In th[is] . . .is found
the true distinction between what properly belongs to the
church and what to the state.
78
With this even the Danbury Baptists had agreed; for while
declaring that the government should be prohibited from inter-
fering with or limiting religious activities, they also had agreed
that it was a legitimate function of government "to punish the
man who works ill to his neighbor."79 Jefferson had already
declared this as his position twenty years before the Danbury
letter:
The legitimate powers of government extend to such acts
only as are injurious to others.8 0
77. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878).
78. Id. at 163 (quoting 12 HENING'S STAT. 84).
79. Letter from the Danbury Baptist Association to Thomas Jefferson,
supra note 63.
80. THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 231 (1794)
(Query XVIII).
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The Reynolds Court, therefore, and others (for example,
Commonwealth v. Nesbit 1 and Lindenmuller v. People82), identified
actions into which-if perpetrated in the name of religion-the
government did have legitimate reason to intrude. Those activi-
ties included human sacrifice, polygamy, bigamy, concubinage,
incest, infanticide, parricide, advocation and promotion of
immorality, etc. Such acts, even if perpetrated in the name of
religion, would be stopped by the government since they were
"subversive of good order" and were "overt acts against peace and
good order." However, agreeing with Jefferson, the Reynolds
Court acknowledged that the government would never interfere
with traditional or non-subversive religious practices.
Therefore, the modern Court is wrong: Reynolds' use of Jef-
ferson's phrase did not summarize the intent of the Establish-
ment Clause; it summarized the intent of the Free Exercise
Clause-as Jefferson had intended. Imagine the results if Jeffer-
son's metaphor were used as originally applied: virtually every
one of the Court's Establishment Clause decisions of recent years
would be reversed because the "wall" would prohibit the govern-
ment from interfering with the "free exercise of religion" at grad-
uations, in athletic events, city seals, courthouse displays, etc.
That is, since a prayer at a football game is neither subversive nor
an overt act against the peace and safety of the state, it is there-
fore an act protected by, not prohibited by, Jefferson's wall of
separation. Nevertheless, the Court now cites Jefferson in Estab-
lishment Clause cases and virtually ignores him in Free Exercise
cases-a complete reversal both of Jefferson's intent and of the
Court's original usage of him.
2. The Wrong Model
The Court regularly invokes Virginia, particularly the 1786
Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom, as its historical model for
interpreting the First Amendment. For example, in Everson the
Court declared:
This Court has previously recognized that the provisions of
the First Amendment ... had the same objective and were
intended to provide the same protection against govern-
mental intrusion on religious liberty as the Virginia
Statute.s3
81. 34 Pa. 398 (1859).
82. 33 Barb. 548 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1861).
83. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 13 (1947) (citing Davis v. Beason,
133 U.S. 333, 342 (1889); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878); Watson
v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1871)).
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The assertion is that the Virginia Statute was the prototype
for the First Amendment and that the Court "previously recog-
nized" this prototype in Reynolds, Watson, and Davis. This claim is
spurious.
Contrary to the Court's assertion, on no occasion in Davis v.
Beason did the Court ever mention the Virginia Statute. However,
the Mormon plaintiffs used the Virginia Statute to argue that the
government should not interfere with their polygamy. The
Court rejected that argument and instead pointed to the fact-as
it had previously done in Reynolds-that in 1788, two years after
the Virginia Statute, Virginia established the death penalty for
polygamy. The Court's rejection of the appellants' arguments
using the Virginia Statute was absolute:
Probably never before in the history of this country has it
been seriously contended that the whole punitive power of
the government for acts, recognized by the general con-
sent of the Christian world . . . . must be suspended in
order that the tenets of a religious sect ... may be carried
out without hindrance.84
Thus, Davis v. Beason did not "recognize" that the Virginia
Statute had any relation to the First Amendment; and the Court
rejected the appellants' arguments invoking the Virginia Statute
on the basis of "the general consent of the Christian world 8s5 and
"the laws of ... Christian countries. '"86
The Everson Court was also wrong in citing Watson v. Jones-
not once in that case was the Virginia Statute-or even Vir-
ginia-ever mentioned.
In the third case cited by Everson, the Court quoted from the
Virginia Statute to establish that polygamy was one of the few
actions permitting the government to interfere with a religious
expression.
8 7
In short, not one of the three cases cited by the Everson
Court provided any "recognition" of the First Amendment as a
corollary to the Virginia Statute. Nevertheless, the Court now
believes the Virginia Statute to be the basis of and the standard
for religious liberty in America. For example, in Engel v. Vitale,
the Court declared:
In 1785-1786, those opposed to the established Church,
led by James Madison and Thomas Jefferson . . . opposed
all religious establishments by law on grounds of principle
84. Davis, 133 U.S. at 343.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 341.
87. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 163.
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[and] obtained the enactment of the famous "Virginia Bill
for Religious Liberty."
88
In McDaniel v. Paty, the Court again declared:
The struggle for separation of church and state in Virginia
... influenced developments in other States .... 89
And in McGowan v. Maryland, Justices Frankfurter and
Harlan similarly declared:
This Court has considered the happenings surrounding
the Virginia General Assembly's enactment of "An act for
establishing religious freedom," written by Thomas Jeffer-
son and sponsored by James Madison, as best reflecting the
long and intensive struggle for religious freedom in
America, as particularly relevant in the search for the First
Amendment's meaning.90
What was the history of the Virginia Statute, and what effect
did it have on religious liberty in America? Was it truly the Amer-
ican model?
In Virginia, the Church of England (the Anglican Church)
was the only legally recognized denomination even though the
members of other denominations (Baptists, Presbyterians,
Quakers, etc.) were more numerous. To redress this inequity, in
1779 Jefferson authored the Virginia Statute to disestablish the
Anglican Church and place all denominations on an equal foot-
ing; however, Jefferson was unable to obtain passage of the Stat-
ute and before he could do so, a congressional appointment
called him overseas to represent American interests during the
Revolution. In his absence, James Madison championed the bill
and led the fight for its passage, finally achieving disestablish-
ment in 1785.
The Court believes that what Madison and Jefferson did with
this celebrated Statute was the norm for the entire nation. It was
not. Much of what Madison and Jefferson fought for and eventu-
ally accomplished in Virginia had already occurred in many
other States well prior to the Virginia Statute.
For example, a decade earlier in 1776, North Carolina had
enacted a disestablishment constitutional clause declaring:
There shall be no establishment of any one religious
church or denomination in this state in preference to any
other, neither shall any person, on any pretence whatso-
ever, be compelled to attend any place or worship contrary
88. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 428 (1962).
89. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 629 n.9 (1978).
90. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 437 (1961) (citations omitted).
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to his own faith or judgment, nor be obliged to pay for the
purchase of any glebe, or the building of any house of wor-
ship, or for the maintenance of any minister or ministry
contrary to what he believes right, or has voluntarily and
personally engaged to perform; but all persons shall be at
liberty to exercise their own mode of worship.
9'
New Jersey had enacted disestablishment in its constitution
the same year.9" The next year, 1777, the New York Constitution
disestablished:
Whereas we are required by the benevolent principles of
rational liberty, not only to expel civil tyranny, but also to
guard against that spiritual oppression and intolerance,
wherewith the bigotry and ambition of weak and wicked
priests and princes have scourged mankind; this conven-
tion doth further, in the name and by the authority of the
good people of this state, ordain, determine, and declare,
that the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profes-
sion and worship, without discrimination or preference,
shall forever hereafter be allowed within this state to all
mankind.93
Vermont also disestablished in 1777.94 Delaware gave equal
denominational protection9 5 well before Virginia; and Penn-
sylvania9 6 and Georgia 97 had also established religious liberty
prior to the Virginia Statute. Furthermore, as early as 1773,
Samuel Chase and William Paca (signers of the Declaration) led
91. THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE SEVERAL INDEPENDENT STATES OF AMERICA;
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE; THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION BETWEEN
THE SAID STATES; THE TREATIES BETWEEN His MOST CHRISTIAN MAJESTY AND THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA-AND THE TREATIES BETWEEN THEIR HIGH MIGHTI-
NESSES THE STATES GENERAL OF THE UNITED NETHERLANDS AND THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA, 138 (Boston, Norman & Bowen 1785) [hereinafter THE
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE SEVERAL INDEPENDENT STATES OF AMERICA] (North Caro-
lina 1776, § 34).
92. Id. at 73-74 (N.J. CONST. of 1776, § 19).
93. Id. at 67 (N.Y. CONST. of 1777, § 38).
94. 6 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTION, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND
OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES Now OR
HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 3740 (Francis Newton
Thorpe ed., 1909) [hereinafter THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITrrTION] (VT.
CONST. of 1777, Declaration of Rights, § 3).
95. THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE SEVERAL INDEPENDENT STATES OF AMERICA,
supra note 91, at 91 (DEL CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, § 2).
96. Id. at 77 (PA. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, § 2).
97. Id. at 166 (GA. CONST. of 1777, § 56).
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Maryland's fight to end the system of State-ordered tithes,98
something Jefferson and Madison did not attempt in Virginia
until years later.
Further confirmation that Virginia did not lead the nation
was provided at the Constitutional Convention. The other dele-
gates rejected the Virginia plan in preference for the Connecti-
cut plan and voted down forty of Madison's seventy-one
proposals (sixty percent).99
Despite what the Court claims, Virginia was not the model
for the nation, and the Virginia Statute was not the sole source of
religious liberty in America; many other States made substantial
progress prior to that in Virginia. If the Court insists on having a
State model by which to interpret the federal Constitution's relig-
ion clauses, perhaps it should look instead to Pennsylvania, Dela-
ware, New York, Maryland, or a State that made progress well
before Virginia.
3. The Wrong Expert
The Court regularly invokes Thomas Jefferson as one of its
two historical authorities capable of establishing original intent.
As the Court explained in Everson:
This Court has previously recognized that the provisions of
the First Amendment, in the drafting and adoption of
which Madison and Jefferson played such leading roles
100
(Similar recognitions are found in other cases,' 01 including
the declaration that Jefferson and Madison were "the architects
of the First Amendment."' 10 2)
Although contemporary courts adjudge Jefferson an author-
ity on the Constitution's First Amendment, Jefferson asserted
that he was an authority on neither the Constitution nor the Bill
of Rights. In fact, when a Jefferson supporter declared in a writ-
ten work thatJefferson was a leading constitutional authority, Jef-
ferson instructed him to correct that error:
98. 1 JOHN V.L. MCMAHON, AN HISTORICAL VIEW OF THE GOVERNMENT OF
MARYLAND FROM ITS COLONIZATION TO THE PRESENT DAY 380-400 (Balt., F.
Lucas Jr., Cushing & Sons, and William & Joseph Neal 1831).
99. FORREST McDONALD, Novus ORDo SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORI-
GINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 208-09 (1985), compiled from 1, 2 THE RECORDS OF
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter FAR-
RAND'S RECORDS].
100. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 13 (1947).
101. See, e.g., McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 629 n.9 (1978); Sch. Dist. of
Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 214 (1963).
102. Sch. Dist. of Abington, 374 U.S. at 234-35.
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One passage, in the paper you enclosed me, must be cor-
rected. It is the following, "and all say it was yourself more
than any other individual, that planned and established it,"
i.e., the Constitution. I was in Europe when the Constitu-
tion was planned, and never saw it till after it was
established. 
103
Since Jefferson did not participate in framing the Constitu-
tion and was not even in America when it was framed, he prop-
erly acknowledged that he could not be considered an authority.
Furthermore, Jefferson had only a minimal influence on the Bill
of Rights:
On receiving it [the Constitution while in France] I wrote
strongly to Mr. Madison urging the want of provision for
the freedom of religion, freedom of the press, trial by jury,
habeas corpus, the substitution of militia for a standing
army, and an express reservation to the States of all rights
not specifically granted to the Union .... This is all the
hand I had in what related to the Constitution.1 °4
In short, Jefferson arrived back in America two years after
the Constitution was written and signed and almost two months
after the language of the First Amendment had been completed.
Significantly, there were fifty-five individuals directly
involved in framing the Constitution at the Constitutional Con-
vention and an additional ninety in the first federal Congress
that framed the First Amendment and Bill of Rights. Allowing
for the overlap of nineteen individuals who were both at the Con-
stitutional Convention and a part of the first Congress, 0 5 there
were one hundred and twenty-six individual participants in the
framing of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. Jefferson was
not one of either group, yet today he is cited as if he single-
handedly authored those documents. (Additional authorities
capable of establishing the intent of the Constitution and the
First Amendment would include the members of the State ratify-
ing conventions wherein extensive debates were held on the
103. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Dr. Joseph Priestly (une 19, 1802),
in 10 THE WRITINGS OF THOMASJEFFERSON, supra note 35, at 325.
104. Id.
105. Ten members of the Constitutional Convention also served in the
first federal Senate (William Few, Richard Bassett, George Read, Pierce Butler,
William Paterson, Robert Morris, Oliver Ellsworth, William Samuel Johnson,
Caleb Strong, andJohn Langdon) and nine members of the Convention served
in the first federal House (Abraham Baldwin, James Madison, Hugh William-
son, Daniel Carroll, George Clymer, Thomas Fitzsimons, Roger Sherman,
Elbridge Gerry, and Nicholas Gilman).
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meaning and intent of each clause; Jefferson was in not in those
conventions either.)
If not Jefferson, who, then, was responsible for the First
Amendment and the Bill of Rights? James Madison? Definitely
not. In fact, during the Constitutional Convention, Virginian
George Mason had advocated that a Bill of Rights be added to
the Constitution, °6 but the other Virginians at the Convention-
including James Madison-opposed any Bill of Rights and their
position prevailed.1 °7 Consequently, George Mason, Elbridge
Gerry, Edmund Randolph, and others at the Convention refused
to sign the new Constitution because of their fear of insufficiently
bridled federal power.'0 8
Mason and the others returned to their home States to lobby
against the ratification of the Constitution until a Bill of Rights
was added. As a result of their voices (and numerous others who
agreed with them), the ratification of the Constitution almost
failed in Virginia,'0 9 Massachusetts," 0 New Hampshire,"' and
New York." 2 Rhode Island flatly refused to ratify it,' and North
Carolina refused to do so until limitations were placed upon the
federal government." 4 Although the Constitution was eventually
ratified, a clear message had been delivered: there was strong
sentiment demanding the inclusion of a Bill of Rights.
When the Constitution was considered for ratification in Vir-
ginia, the reports from June 2 through June 25, 1788, make clear
that in Virginia, Patrick Henry, George Mason, and Edmund
106. 3JAMES MADISON, THE PAPERS OFJAMES MADISON 1565-66 (Henry D.
Gilpin ed., D.C., Langtree & O'Sullivan 1840) (Sept. 12, 1787); see also 2
GEORGE BANCROFT, BANCROFT'S HISTORY OF THE FORMATION OF THE CONSTITU-
TION 209-10 (N.Y., D. Appleton & Co. 1882), and 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra
note 99, at 587-88 (Sept. 12, 1787), 637 (Sept. 15, 1787).
107. 1 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 306 (Jonathan Elliot ed., D.C. 1836) (Sept. 12,
1787) [hereinafter ELLIOT'S DEBATES].
108. See George Mason, Edmund Randolph, & Elbridge Gerry, in Dic-
TIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY.
109. Virginia Ratification Debates, June 25, 1788, in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES,
supra note 107, at 652-55.
110. Massachusetts Ratification Debates, February 6, 1788, in 2 ELLIOT'S
DEBATES, supra note 107, at 176-81.
111. JOSEPH B. WALKER, THE N.H. FEDERAL CONVENTION, 1788, at 41-42
(Boston, Cupples & Hurd 1888) (June 21, 1788).
112. New York Ratification Debates, July 26, 1788, in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES,
supra note 107, at 413.
113. 5 COLLECTIONS OF THE RHODE ISLAND HISTORICAL SOCIETY 320-21
(Providence, Knowles & Vose 1843) (March 24, 1788).
114. North Carolina Ratification Debates, August 1-2, 1788, in 4 ELLIOT'S
DEBATES, supra note 107, at 242-51.
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Randolph led the fight for the Bill of Rights, again over James
Madison's opposition." 5 Henry's passionate speeches of June 5
and June 7 resulted in Virginia's motion that a Bill of Rights be
added to the federal Constitution; on June 25, the Virginia Con-
vention selected George Mason to chair a committee to prepare
a proposed Bill of Rights, 1 6 with Patrick Henry and John Ran-
dolph as members." 7 Mason incorporated Henry's arguments as
the basis of Virginia's proposal on religious liberty." 8
Although Madison had opposed a Bill of Rights, he under-
stood the grim political reality that without one, it was unlikely
the new Constitution would receive widespread public accept-
ance.' Consequently, he withdrew his opposition, and in the
federal House of Representatives he introduced his own versions
of the amendments offered by his State.
Very little of Madison's proposed religious wording made it
into the final version of the First Amendment; and even a cursory
examination of the debates in Congress surrounding the forma-
tion of that Amendment quickly reveals the influence of Fisher
Ames and Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts, Samuel Livermore of
New Hampshire, John Vining of Delaware, Daniel Carroll and
Charles Carroll of Maryland, Benjamin Huntington, Roger Sher-
man, and Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut, William Paterson of
New Jersey, and others on that Amendment.'
The Court is wrong: neither Jefferson nor Madison was
responsible for the First Amendment. As correctly noted by
Chief Justice Rehnquist:
[T] he Court's opinion in Everson-while correct in brack-
eting Madison and Jefferson together in their exertions in
their home state leading to the enactment of the Virginia
Statute of Religious Liberty-is totally incorrect in sug-
gesting that Madison carried these views onto the floor of
115. James Madison, Virginia Ratification Debates, June 24, 1788, in 3
ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 107 at 616-22.
116. 1 ROWLAND, supra note 75, at 244.
117. Virginia Ratification Debates, June 25, 1788, in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES,
supra note 107, at 655-56.
118. 1 WILLIAM WIRT HENRY, PATRICK HENRY, LIFE, CORRESPONDENCE AND
SPEECHES 430-31 (N.Y., Charles Scribner's Sons 1891); see also I ROWLAND, supra
note 75, at 244; 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 107, at 659 (Virginia Ratification
Debates, June 27, 1788).
119. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 448-50 (1789); see also Wallace v. Jaffree, 472
U.S. 38, 93-99 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Letter fromJames Madison to
George Eve (Jan. 2, 1789), in 5 THE WRITINGS OFJAMES MADISON 319 n.4 (Gail-
lard Hunt ed., 1904).
120. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 440-948 (1789), for the records chronicling
the debates surrounding the framing of the First Amendment.
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the United States House of Representatives when he pro-
posed the language which would ultimately become the
Bill of Rights. The repetition of this error in the Court's
opinion in Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education and,
inter alia, Engel v. Vitale does not make it any sounder his-
torically. Finally, in Abington School District v. Schempp the
Court made the truly remarkable statement that "the views
of Madison and Jefferson, preceded by Roger Williams,
came to be incorporated not only in the Federal Constitu-
tion but likewise in those of most of our States." On the
basis of what evidence we have, this statement is demon-
strably incorrect as a matter of history. And its repetition in
varying forms in succeeding opinions of the Court can give
it no more authority than it possesses as a matter of fact;
stare decisis may bind courts as to matters of law, but it can-
not bind them as to matters of history.'
2 1
The Court's failure to rely on Founders other than Jefferson
(or Madison) seems to imply that no other Founders were quali-
fied to address First Amendment issues or that no pertinent
recorded statements exist from the other Founders. Both impli-
cations are wrong: numerous Founders played pivotal roles, and
thousands of their writings do exist.
However, if the Court insists that only a Virginian may speak
for the nation on the issue of religion, then why not George
Mason, the "Father of the Bill of Rights"? Or Richard Henry Lee
who not only framed Virginia's proposals but who also was a
Member of the first federal Congress where he helped frame the
Bill of Rights? Or George Eve and John Leland who exerted sig-
nificant external influence on the internal proceedings of the
State ratifying convention and the first federal Congress? Or why
not George Washington? In fact, constitutionally speaking, as
President of the Convention that framed the Constitution, and as
President of the United States who oversaw the framing of the
First Amendment and the Bill of Rights, Washington is perhaps a
far more qualified spokesman than Madison, and definitely more
so than Jefferson. Perhaps the reason that these other Virginians
are ignored (as are most of the other Framers) is because both
their words and actions unequivocally contradict the Court's cur-
rent positions.
George Washington provides a succinct illustration. During
his inauguration, Washington took the oath as prescribed by the
Constitution but added several religious components to that offi-
121. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 98-99 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted).
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cial ceremony. Before taking his oath of office, he summoned a
Bible on which to take the oath, added the words "So help me
God!" to the end of the oath, then leaned over and kissed the
Bible. 122 His "Inaugural Address" was filled with numerous relig-
ious references, 12 3 and, following that address, he and the Con-
gress "proceeded to St. Paul's Chapel, where Divine service was
performed."
1 24
Only weeks later, Washington signed his first major federal
bill12 5-the Northwest Ordinance, drafted concurrently with the
creation of the First Amendment.126 That act stipulated that for
a territory to become a State, the "schools and the means of edu-
cation" in that territory must encourage the "religion, morality,
and knowledge" that was "necessary to good government and the
happiness of mankind."'127  Conforming to this requirement,
numerous subsequent State constitutions included that clause,1
8
and it still appears in State constitutions today. 129 Furthermore,
that law is listed in the current federal code, along with the Con-
stitution, the Declaration, and the Articles of Confederation, as
one of America's four "organic" or foundational laws.' 3 0
122. See, e.g., 4 WASHINGTON IRVING, LIFE OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 116
(1904); CHARLES CARLETON COFFIN, BUILDING THE NATION 26 (N.Y., Harper &
Brothers Publishers 1882); MRS. C.M. KIRKLAND, MEMOIRS OF WASHINGTON 438
(N.Y., D. Appleton & Co. 1870).
123. 1 RiCHARDSON, supra note 69, at 51-54 (Apr. 30, 1789).
124. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 29 (1789).
125. ACTS PASSED AT A CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
BEGUN AND HELD AT THE CITY OF NEW-YORK, ON WEDNESDAY THE FOURTH OF
MARCH, IN THE YEAR M,DCC,LXXXIX: AND THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES, THE THIRTEENTH 47 (Phil., Francis Childs &John Swaine 1791) (Aug. 7,
1789).
126. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 685 (1789) (passage by the House); Id. at 57
(1789) (passage by the Senate).
127. THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 375 (N.Y.,
Evert Duyckinck 1813) ("An Ordinance of the Territory of the United States
Northwest of the River Ohio," art. 111).
128. See, e.g., M.B.C. TRUE, A MANUAL OF THE HISTORY AND CIVIL GOVERN-
MENT OF THE STATE OF NEBRASKA 34 (Omaha, Gibson, Miller, & Richardson
1885) (NEB. CONST. 1875, art. I, § 4); THE CONSTITUTIONS OF ALL THE UNITED
STATES ACCORDING TO THE LATEST AMENDMENTS 389 (Lexington, Thomas T.
Skillman 1817) (Mississippi 1817, art. IX, § 16); THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, supra note 127, at 345-46 (Ohio 1802, art. VIII,
§ 3); (House of Representatives, Mis. Doc. No. 44, 35th Cong., 2nd Sess., Feb. 2,
1859, 3-4, Kansas 1858, art. I, § 7).
129. See NEB. CONST. art. I, § 4 (West 2002); N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 1
(West 2002); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. art. I, § 7 (West 2002).
130. U.S.C.A., art. I, at 17 (West 1987) (The Organic Laws of the United
States of America).
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Finally, in his "Farewell Address," Washington reminded the
nation:
Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political
prosperity, Religion and Morality are indispensable sup-
ports. In vain would that Man claim the tribute of Patriot-
ism, who would labor to subvert these great pillars of
human happiness .... The mere Politician, equally with
the pious Man, ought to respect and to cherish them. 3 '
Washington-indisputably a constitutional expert-
declared that religion and morality were inseparable from good
government, and that no true patriot, whether politician or cler-
gyman, would attempt to weaken the relationship between politi-
cal prosperity and the influence of religion and morality.
Nonetheless, the Court persists in reaching conclusions exactly
the opposite of those set forth by this constitutional expert, thus
causing Chief Justice Rehnquist to query:
History must judge whether it was the Father of his Coun-
try in 1789, or a majority of the Court today, which has
strayed from the meaning of the Establishment Clause.'" 2
By utilizing Jefferson and Madison as the only spokesmen
for the First Amendment, contemporary courts have chosen one
who was out of the country at the time of its formation and
another who felt it unnecessary.
4. The Wrong Rigidity to the Metaphor
In Everson v. Board of Education, the Court declared:
The First Amendment has erected a wall between church
and state. That wall must be kept high and impregnable.
We could not approve the slightest breach."'S
In McCollum v. Board of Education, fourJustices reemphasized
that position:
Separation means separation, not something less. Jeffer-
son's metaphor in describing the relation between Church
and State speaks of a "wall of separation," not of a fine line
easily overstepped."'
131. GEORGE WASHINGTON, ADDRESS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, PRESIDENT
OF THE UNITED STATES, TO His FELLOW CITIZENS, ON DECLINING BEING CONSID-
ERED AS A CANDIDATE FOR THEIR FUTURE SUFFRAGES 22-23 (Balt., George &
Henry S. Keatinge 1796).
132. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 113 (1985) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
133. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
134. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 231 (1948) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
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Recent Courts have interpreted Jefferson's "wall" to be fixed
and inflexible, requiring a segregation of faith from public life.
Yet despite frequent repetitions to the contrary, the "wall of sepa-
ration" metaphor was not intended by Jefferson to be a wall of
secularization. In fact, Jefferson used another metaphor with ref-
erence to religion that proffered much less than the rigid "wall"
image. Before examining his other simile, it is crucial to under-
stand why the "wall" metaphor was included in Jefferson's 1802
letter.
The New England Federalist clergy were some of the most
ardent opponents of Jefferson and his Republican supporters.
Even though the State religious establishments empowering the
Federalist clergy were averse to Jefferson, these establishments
were completely permissible under the Constitution which for-
bade only federal establishments. Nevertheless, Jefferson's per-
sonal view that all denominations should be placed on equal
footing1 35 was applauded by Baptists across the nation-espe-
cially in New England where they were accustomed to ill treat-
ment by the Federalist clergy.
Jefferson's Federalist enemies in New England embraced
every occasion to calumniate him, and found one such welcome
opportunity in his refusal to call for a national day of prayer.
New Englanders were great believers in proclaimed days of
prayer such as those issued by Presidents George Washington
and John Adams, for this was a practice deeply embedded in
their own history: between 1620 and 1815, over 1,400 official
prayer proclamations had been issued in New England States.1" 6
(This practice was rarely observed in the Southern States how-
ever, even by the most evangelical Southern leaders such as Gov-
ernor Patrick Henry.) The New England Federalists gleefully
ascribed Jefferson's reticence to issue national prayer proclama-
tions as proof of his atheism.
In addition to the charge of atheism, New England Federal-
ists also accused Jefferson of being a murderer, the Anti-Christ, a
thief, and a cohort of foreign convicts; they reported that he was
secretly plotting the destruction and overthrow of the Constitu-
tion; that he defrauded a widow and her children; the nation was
alerted that he planned to abolish the navy and starve the farm-
ers; and citizens were warned that if Jefferson were elected, he
135. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Elbridge Gerry (Jan. 26, 1799), in 9
THE Woms OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 61, at 18.
136. DELOSS LoxrE, THE FAST AND THANKSGIVING DAYS OF NEw ENGLAND
464-514 (Boston, Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1895) (Fast and Thanksgiving Days
Calendar).
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would confiscate and burn every Bible in America. 37 (This
charge was so widely disseminated that in New England Bibles
were actually buried upon Jefferson's election so that he could
not find and burn them.1 3 8 )
Jefferson truly had many unscrupulous enemies, but the
Baptists were not among them. Therefore, when Jefferson
received the letter of praise from the Danbury Baptists, courtesy
required a reply. It also gave Jefferson an opportunity to lash out
at their common enemy, so his reply directly attacked the New
England Federalist clergy. Jefferson derisively compared them to
British Loyalists since, as he pointed out, it had also been the
practice of the British Monarch to issue national prayer
proclamations.
Before dispatching his reply, Jefferson consulted the two
members of his administration most familiar with the political
landscape in New England: Postmaster Gideon Granger of Con-
necticut and Attorney General Levi Lincoln of Massachusetts.
Both men had been victims of attacks by the New England Feder-
alists and were well acquainted with the situation of the minority
Baptists. Based on Lincoln's familiarity with the New England
mindset, Jefferson asked him to review his draft and recommend
necessary changes:
Averse to receive addresses, yet unable to prevent them, I
have generally endeavored to turn them to some account,
by making them the occasion, by way of answer, of sowing
useful truths and principles among the people, which
might germinate and become rooted among their political
tenets. The Baptist address, now enclosed, admits of a con-
demnation of the alliance between Church and State,
under the authority of the Constitution. It furnishes an
occasion, too, which I have long wished to find, of saying
why I do not proclaim fastings and thanksgivings, as my
predecessors did. The address, to be sure, does not point at
this, and its introduction is awkward. But I foresee no
opportunity of doing it more pertinently. I know it will give
great offence to the New England clergy; but the advocate
of religious freedom is to expect neither peace nor forgive-
ness from them. Will you be so good as to examine the
137. See, e.g., DUMAS MALONE, JEFFERSON THE PRESIDENT, FIRST TERM,
1801-1805, 206-23 (1970); CHARLES WARREN, ODD BYWAYS IN AMERICAN His-
TORY 127-35 (1942); DUMAS MALONE, JEFFERSON AND THE ORDEAL OF LIBERTY
479-83 (1962); W.E. MACCLENNY, THE LIFE OF REV. JAMES O'KELLY 171-73
(1910); Charles 0. Lerche, Jr., Jefferson and the Election of 1800: A Case Study in the
Political Smear, 5 WM. & MARY Q. (n.s.) 466-91 (1948).
138. MACCLENNY, supra note 137, at 172.
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answer, and suggest any alterations which might prevent an
ill effect, or promote a good one, among the people? You
understand the temper of those in the North, and can
weaken it, therefore, to their stomachs: it is at present sea-
soned to the Southern taste only. I would ask the favor of
you to return it, with the address, in the course of the day
or evening. Health and affection.'" 9
Lincoln responded promptly to Jefferson's request and sug-
gested several changes that Jefferson incorporated. Jefferson's
initial response had been twenty-five handwritten lines; after Lin-
coln's revisions, seven of those lines-nearly thirty percent of the
text-were stricken.1 4 0 Lincoln recognized that the President's
strong attack on the New England clergy would indeed please his
Southern supporters, but he warned that attacking the proclaim-
ing of days of prayer would hurt him among his Republican sup-
porters in New England who still cherished that practice.
(Lincoln rightly believed that Jefferson's letter would be widely
publicized-as it was in several newspapers within only months
after Jefferson penned it.14 1 ) The tone of the letter was greatly
softened and the language meliorated by Lincoln's
suggestions. 1
42
On Friday, January 1, 1802, Jefferson sent his revised reply to
the Danbury Baptists with his now infamous "wall of separation"
metaphor. Two days later, on Sunday, January 3, 1802, Jefferson
went to the U. S. Capitol where he attended church services in
the House of Representatives, the sermon being preached by his
Republican friend, Baptist minister John Leland. 4 3 Clearly, Jef-
ferson's understanding of his "wall of separation" did not
exclude that religious activity-conducted in a government
building with operating expenses paid by government funds.
Jefferson's "wall" was simply a fresh descriptor for what he
had long been advocating: the government should be completely
powerless to interfere with religious expressions. As Jefferson
explained to Noah Webster, if the government was permitted
even once to interfere with religious expression, additional
encroachments would surely follow:
139. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Attorney General, Levi Lincoln
(Jan. 1, 1802), in 10 THE WRITINGS OF TuiOMASJEFFERSON, supra note 35, at 305.
140. James Hutson, A Wall of Separation: FBI Helps Restore Jefferson's Obliter-
ated Draft, 57 LIBR. OF CONG. INFO. BULL. 4 (June 1998), at http://lcweb.loc.
gov/loc/lcib/9806/danbury.html (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law,
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It had become an universal and almost uncontroverted
position in the several States, that the purposes of society
do not require a surrender of all our rights to our ordinary
governors . . . and which experience has nevertheless
proved they will be constantly encroaching on, if submitted
to them; that there are also certain fences which experi-
ence has proved peculiarly efficacious against wrong, and
rarely obstructive of right, which yet the governing powers
have ever shown a disposition to weaken and remove. Of
the first kind, for instance, is freedom of religion.' 44
Notice that Jefferson here used a "fence" metaphor-that
the fence would obstruct the wrong (the action of governors
upon our rights) but not the right (the freedom of religion). Jef-
ferson's "fence" metaphor, like his "wall" metaphor, was pointed
toward the Free Exercise and not the Establishment Clause.
Contrary to the assertion in McCollum, Jefferson's separation
did mean something significantly less than separation-at least
the way the Court now interprets separation.
5. The Wrong Text Selections
While the Court repeatedly cites Jefferson's "wall" metaphor
in a sweeping, all-encompassing, one-size-fits-all manner, it often
ignores succinct Jefferson writings pointedly germane to issues
before the Court. For example, in Edwards v. Aguillard the Court
struck down Louisiana's balanced-treatment law stipulating that
if either evolution or creation was presented "in classroom lec-
tures, textbooks, library materials, or other programs,"' 45 that
"each shall be taught as a theory rather than proven scientific
fact." 1
4 6
Even though the statute further mandated that instruction
be limited to an examination only of "scientific data" and the "sci-
entific evidence" for either position,' 47 and never mentioned
religion, God, or the Bible, the Court nevertheless found it an
unconstitutional establishment of religion in violation of Jeffer-
son's "wall." Yet Jefferson had clearly set forth an opposite posi-
tion concerning government interference in the free inquiry
between faith and science:
144. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Noah Webster (Dec. 4, 1790), in 8
THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 35, at 112-13.
145. Gregory Sarno & Alan Stephens, Annotation, Constitutionality of
Teaching or Suppressing Teaching of Biblical Creationism or Darwinian Evolution The-
oy in Public Schools, 102 A.L.R. FED. 537, 547-48, § 6 (1991).
146. Id.
147. Id. (emphasis added).
THE IMAGE AND THE REALITY
Had not the Roman government permitted free enquiry,
Christianity could never have been introduced. Had not
free enquiry been indulged, at the aera of the Reforma-
tion, the corruptions of Christianity could not have been
purged away. If it be restrained now, the present corrup-
tions will be protected, and new ones encouraged. Was the
government to prescribe to us our medicine and diet, our
bodies would be in such keeping as our souls are now.
Thus in France the emetic was once forbidden as a
medicine, and the potato as an article of food. Govern-
ment is just as infallible, too when it fixes systems in phys-
ics. Galileo was sent to the Inquisition for affirming that
the earth was a sphere; the government had declared it to
be as flat as a trencher, and Galileo was obliged to abjure
his error. This error however at length prevailed, the earth
became a globe, and Descartes declared it was whirled
round its axis by a vortex. The government in which he
lived was wise enough to see that this was no question of
civil jurisdiction, or we should all have been involved by
authority in vortices. In fact, the vortices have been
exploded, and the Newtonian principle of gravitation is
now more firmly established, on the basis of reason, than it
would be were the government to step in, and to make it
an article of necessary faith. Reason and experiment have
been indulged, and error has fled before them. It is error
alone which needs the support of government. Truth can
stand by itself. Subject opinion to coercion: whom will you
make your inquisitors? Fallible men; men governed by bad
passions, by private as well as public reasons. And why sub-
ject it to coercion? To produce uniformity. But is uniform-
ity of opinion desireable? No more than of face and
stature. Introduce the bed of Procrustes then, and as there
is danger that the large men may beat the small, make us
all of a size, by lopping the former and stretching the lat-
ter. Difference of opinion is advantageous.... Reason and
persuasion are the only practicable instruments. To make
way for these, free enquiry must be indulged.'4 8
Jefferson specifically declared that it was outside the jurisdic-
tion of government to establish any type of orthodoxy in science
by precluding the investigation or pursuit of truth, regardless of
whether it was supported or opposed by religious or civil authori-
ties. The Court ignored this succinct writing in deference to a
148. JEFFERSON, supra note 80, at 232-34 (Query XVII).
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broad metaphor, resulting-quite literally-in the Court using
Jefferson to overrule Jefferson.
Another example of how Jefferson's authoritative declara-
tions are ignored is provided by his unequivocal pronouncement
that:
No power to prescribe any religious exercise or to assume
authority in any religious discipline has been delegated to
the General Government. It must then rest with the
States.1 4 9
Notwithstanding this unambiguous pronouncement, the
"general government" uses Jefferson as its authority to strike
down State religious policies on: school prayer (Engel v. Vitale'5 0 ),
acknowledgment of a Creator (Epperson v. Arkansas15' and
Edwards v. Aguillard 2), display of the Ten Commandments
(Stone v. Graham'53 ), as well as numerous other State policies on
religious exercises 154 that Jefferson had affirmed as properly
"resting with the States."
And consider the number of courts that-using Jefferson's
"wall"-have disallowed religious symbols from the government
square, 55 even though Jefferson himself proposed that govern-
ment seals and phrases incorporate religious symbols and
words. 156
149. Letter from ThomasJefferson to Samuel Miller (Jan. 23, 1808), in 4
MEMOIR OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 33, at 103-04.
150. 370 U.S. 421, 428 (1962).
151. 393 U.S. 97, 106 (1968).
152. 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
153. 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
154. See, e.g., Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985)
(Connecticut law permitting employees not to work on their sabbath); Comm.
for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (New York state policy providing
funds for repair and maintenance of school equipment); Abington Sch. Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (Pennsylvania State policy on voluntary Bible
reading).
155. See, e.g., Allegheny County v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S. 573
(1989) (creches); Stone, 449 U.S. 39; Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 292 F.3d 597 (9th
Cir. 2002) (monotheism in the Pledge of Allegiance); Robinson v. City of
Edmond, 68 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 1995); Washegesic v. Bloomingdale Pub. Sch.,
33 F.3d 679 (6th Cir. 1994) (displays of religious artwork in public buildings);
Harvey v. Cobb County, 15 F.3d 1097 (11th Cir. 1994); Harris v. City of Zion,
927 F.2d 1401 (7th Cir. 1991); Kuhn v. City of Rolling Meadows, 927 F.2d 1401
(7th Cir. 1991); Friedman v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 781 F.2d 777 (10th Cir. 1985)
(religious symbols in city seals); Warsaw v. Tehachapi, No. CV F-90-404 (E.D.
Cal. Aug. 23, 1990); Ring v. Grand Forks Pub. Sch. Dist., 483 F. Supp. 272
(D.N.D. 1980) (public displays of the Ten Commandments); Lowe v. City of
Eugene, 459 P.2d 222 (Or. 1969) (public crosses).
156. Report on a Seal for the United States, with Related Papers, August 20,
1776, in 1 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 44, at 494-97.
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If the Court were to use Jefferson's germane words as its
authority rather than his incongruous metaphor, it would arrive
at different conclusions.
6. The Wrong Standard
The Court has been unequivocally clear-as in Zorach v.
Clauson-that:
The constitutional standard is the separation of Church
and State.
15 7
This declaration is often repeated, albeit with inconsequen-
tial variations such as " . . . the 'wall of separation' required by
the Constitution...,"",58 or ... the constitutional wall of separa-
tion between Church and State... "159
Why is "separation" the "constitutional standard" rather
than "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof'? On what basis
does a metaphor from a private letter written eleven years after
the First Amendment supercede the express language of that
Amendment?
Perhaps the answer rests in the declaration of Charles Evans
Hughes, the Court's Chief Justice from 1930 to 1941:
We are under a Constitution, but the Constitution is what
the judges say it is."'
That this is now the standard for constitutional interpreta-
tion was made evident in the highly publicized Pledge of Alle-
giance decision by the three-judge panel in the Ninth Circuit.
The majority resorted not to the Constitution but instead set
forth its "constitutional standard" under Jefferson's wall:
Over the last three decades, the Supreme Court has used
three interrelated tests to analyze alleged violations of the
Establishment Clause in the realm of public education: the
three-prong test set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman; the
"endorsement" test, first articulated byJustice O'Connor in
her concurring opinion in Lynch, and later adopted by a
157. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 242 (1968); Zorach v.
Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952).
158. Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 781
(1973).
159. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425 (1962).
160. Charles Evans Hughes, Address at Elmira (May 3, 1907), reprinted in
THE AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NoTEs OF CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 144 (DavidJ. Danel-
ski &Joseph S. Tulchin eds., 1973).
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majority of the Court in County of Allegheny v. ACLU; and
the "coercion" test first used by the Court in Lee (1991).161
That court struck down the Pledge of Allegiance policy
because "the policy and the Act fail the endorsement test .... the
coercion test .... [and] the Lemon test"'6 2 but not because the
policy violated the wording of the Constitution.
When confronted with the absence of constitutional lan-
guage in these tests, separation advocates respond that Jeffer-
son's metaphor (and the religion tests derived from it) accurately
summarizes the intent of those who framed the First Amend-
ment. To examine this thesis, the advice ofJefferson to Supreme
Court Justice William Johnson is apropos:
On every question of construction, carry ourselves back to
the time when the Constitution was adopted, recollect the
spirit manifested in the debates, and instead of trying what
meaning may be squeezed out of the text, or invented
against it, conform to the probable one in which it was
passed.' 6 3
The Congressional Records from June 8 to September 24, 1789
chronicle the months of discussions and debates of the ninety
Framers of the First Amendment. 6 4 During those debates, not
one of the ninety ever mentioned the phrase "separation of
Church and State." It seems logical that if this had been their
objective for the First Amendment, at least one would have men-
tioned that phrase; not one did.
The Court's proclivity to substitute its own phrases and tests
for the Constitution's express wording causes legal scholars to
describe the Court as a "continuing Constitutional Conven-
tion. '  George Washington warned against allowing change in
this manner:
If, in the opinion of the people, the distribution or the
modification of the constitutional powers be in any particu-
lar wrong, let it be corrected by an amendment in the way
which the Constitution designates. But let there be no
change by usurpation; for though this in one instance may
161. Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 292 F.3d 597, 605 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations
omitted).
162. Id. at 608, 609, 611.
163. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Judge William Johnson (June 12,
1823), in 4 MEMOIR OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 33, at 373.
164. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 440-948 (1789).
165. RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BYJUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 2 (1977); LEONARD W. LEVY, AGAINST THE LAW
29-30 (1974); JAMES M. BECK, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 221
(1924).
THE IMAGE AND THE REALITY
be the instrument of good, it is the customary weapon by
which free governments are destroyed.' 66
Constitution signer Alexander Hamilton echoed this
warning:
[The] Constitution is the standard to which we are to
cling. Under its banners, bona fide must we combat our
political foes, rejecting all changes but through the chan-
nel itself provides for amendments.
6 7
Contrary to the Court's assertion, the constitutional stan-
dard is not the private metaphor of any single individual but
rather the Constitution itself.
7. The Wrong Purposes and Motivations
By wrongly interpreting Jefferson's metaphor, the Court has
imputed a historically untenable purpose to the First Amend-
ment. For example, in Abington v. Schempp, the Court asserted:
There is no answer to the proposition.., that the effect of
the religious freedom Amendment to our Constitution was
to take every form of propagation of religion out of the
realm of things which could directly or indirectly be made
public business and thereby be supported in whole or in
part at taxpayers' expense.... This freedom was first in the
Bill of Rights because it was first in the forefathers' minds;
it was set forth in absolute terms, and its strength is its
rigidity.
16 8
But there is an answer. In fact, there are several answers, for
there are multiple erroneous assertions in this passage.
First, the charge that the First Amendment was "to take
every form of propagation of religion out of the realm of things
that could directly or indirectly be made public business and
thereby be supported in whole or in part at taxpayers' expense"
is easily refuted byJefferson. Recall that in his official capacity he
engaged in direct federal funding of religion at taxpayer
expense-both in treaties and in the use of government build-
ings for religious purposes.
Second, the religion clause in the Bill of Rights was not "first
in the Bill of Rights because it was first in the forefathers' minds."
In the original Bill of Rights as sent to the States for ratification,
166. WASHINGTON, supra note 131, at 22.
167. Letter from Alexander Hamilton to James Bayard (Apr. 1802), in 6
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 542 (John C.
Hamilton ed., 1851).
168. Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 216 (1963).
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the religion amendment was actually the third amendment, pre-
ceded by an amendment addressing congressional representa-
tion and an amendment stipulating that no congressional pay
raise could take effect without an intervening election. There-
fore, based on the Court's logic, congressional representation
and congressional pay raises were more important to the Foun-
ders than freedom of religion.
Further evidence that this was not "first in the forefathers'
minds" is provided by the States' recommendations to the federal
Congress for a Bill of Rights. Connecticut,'
69 New Jersey, 17 1
Pennsylvania, 17 1 Georgia,' 72 and Delaware' 73 made no proposals
and therefore suggested no protections for religion. Maryland
did submit a list of proposals, but no religious protections were
included, 174 and its minority report listed religious protections
twelfth. 175 Similarly, Pennsylvania proposed no Bill of Rights,
but its minority report listed religious protections first.176 Massa-
chusetts' proposals to the federal Congress did not include pro-
tection for religion, 177 and even its minority report made no
mention.1 78 South Carolina did submit a list of proposals, but
without mention of any religious protections. 179 New Hampshire
listed religious protections eleventh in its proposals for the Bill of
Rights, 8 ° New York listed it fourth,' 8 ' North Carolina twenti-
169. Benjamin Harrison, Address During the Virginia Ratification
Debates (June 25, 1788), in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 107, at 628.
170. Id.
171. Pennsylvania Ratification Debates, Dec. 12, 1787, in 1 ELLIOT'S
DEBATES, supra note 107, at 319-20.
172. Georgia Ratification Debates, Jan. 2, 1788, in 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES,
supra note 107, at 323-24.
173. Delaware Ratification Debates, Dec. 7, 1787, in 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES,
supra note 107, at 319.
174. Maryland Ratification Debates, Apr. 21, 1788, in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES,
supra note 107, at 549-53.
175. Maryland Ratification Debates, Apr. 28, 1788, in 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES,
supra note 107, at 552-53.
176. THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND
ORIGINS 12 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997) [hereinafter COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS].
177. Massachusetts Ratifying Convention, Feb. 7, 1788, in 1 ELLIOT'S
DEBATES, supra note 107, at 322-23.
178. COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 176, at 12.
179. South Carolina Ratifying Convention, May 23, 1788, in 1 ELLIOT'S
DEBATES, supra note 107, at 325.
180. New Hampshire Ratification Debates, June 21, 1788, in 1 ELLIOT'S
DEBATES, supra note 107, at 326.
181. New York Ratification Debates, July 26, 1788, in 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES,
supra note 107, at 327-28.
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eth, 18 2 and Virginia twentieth. 18 3 When James Madison submit-
ted his proposals in the first federal Congress in 1789, religious
protections were fourth in his list."8 4 In May of 1790, Rhode
Island proposed amendments, and religion appeared fourth in
its list,1 8 5 but that proposal occurred months after the Bill of
Rights had already been hammered out and sent to the States for
ratification. Religion clauses appeared "first in the forefathers'
minds" only in the minority report of Pennsylvania.
Sequential order was important, however, and the clause
that occupied first position most frequently was the language that
eventually became the Ninth and Tenth Amendments. For
example, first in the list of Massachusetts' proposals was:
That it be explicitly declared that all powers not expressly
delegated by the aforesaid Constitution are reserved to the
several States, to be by them exercised.1 8 6
A nearly identical clause was first in the proposals from
North Carolina,"8 7 Virginia, 8 New Hampshire,"8 9 South Caro-
lina,1 9 ° Rhode Island, 91 and Pennsylvania.' 9 2 By this proposal,
the States secured to themselves religious freedoms since the
Constitution gave no express powers to the federal government
pertaining to religion. Therefore, contrary to the assertions by
the Abington Court, religious freedoms were not first in the fore-
fathers' minds (limitations on federal powers were), and there
was no intent to quarantine religion from taxpayers.
182. North Carolina Ratification Debates, Nov. 21, 1789, in 4 ELLIOT'S
DEBATES, supra note 107, at 244.
183. Virginia Ratification Debates, June 26, 1788, in 3 ELLIOT's DEBATES,
supra note 107, at 659.
184. 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 451 (1800).
185. Rhode Island Ratification Debates, May 29, 1790, in 1 ELLIOT's
DEBATES, supra note 107, at 334-37.
186. Massachusetts Ratification Debates, Feb. 6, 1788, in 2 ELLIOT's
DEBATES, supra note 107, at 177.
187. North Carolina Ratification Debates, Aug. 1, 1788, in 4 ELLIOT'S
DEBATES, supra note 107, at 244.
188. Virginia Ratification Debates, June 27, 1788, in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES,
supra note 107, at 659.
189. New Hampshire Ratification Debates, June 21, 1788, in 1 ELLIOT'S
DEBATES, supra note 107, at 325-26.
190. South Carolina Ratification Debates, May 23, 1788, in 1 ELLIOT'S
DEBATES, supra note 107, at 325.
191. Rhode Island Ratification Debates, May 29, 1790, in 1 ELLIOT'S
DEBATES, supra note 107, at 336.
192. Pennsylvania Ratification Debates, Sept. 3, 1788, in 2 ELLIOT'S
DEBATES, supra note 107, at 545.
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Another statement that Jefferson would demur was made by
Justices Frankfurter and Harlan in McGowan v. Maryland and Jus-
tice Brennan in Abington v. Schempp.
The purpose of the Establishment Clause was to assure that
the national legislature would not exert its power in the
service of any purely religious end; that it would not, as
Virginia and virtually all of the Colonies had done, make of
religion, as religion, an object of legislation.
1 93
It is absurd to suggest that the First Amendment kept relig-
ion from being the object of national legislation any more than
the Virginia Statute kept religion from being the object of State
legislation. To the contrary, at the same time that Jefferson
authored and introduced the Virginia Statute-which the Court
identifies as its interpretative corollary for the First Amend-
ment-he simultaneously authored and introduced a number of
bills in which religion was the object of legislation. Those bills
included "A Bill for Saving the Property of the Church Hereto-
fore by Law Established," "A Bill for Punishing Disturbers of
Religious Worship and Sabbath Breakers," "A Bill for Appointing
Days of Public Fasting and Thanksgiving," and "A Bill Annulling
Marriages Prohibited by the Levitical Law and Appointing the
Mode of Solemnizing Lawful Marriage."'9 4 Therefore, while Jef-
ferson was disestablishing religion in the Virginia Statute, he was
also making it the direct object of legislation. Furthermore, Jef-
ferson had made religion the object of federal legislative action
through the ratification of his Kaskaskia treaty directly appropri-
ating federal funds and activities toward Christian evangelization.
Notwithstanding these troublesome facts, the claim by these Jus-
tices became enshrined as the second prong of the Lemon test (a
statute may not advance religion) '9 5-a prong built on an egre-
giously defective historical analysis. As Chief Justice Rehnquist
observed:
[T] he Lemon test has no more grounding in the history of
the First Amendment than does the wall theory upon
which it rests.'
9 6
193. Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 234 (1963) (Brennan,
J., concurring); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 465 (1961) (Frankfurter,
J., and Harlan, J., concurring).
194. 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 38, at 396.
195. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (citing Bd. of Educ. v.
Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968)).
196. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 108, 110 (1985) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
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Another declaration thatJefferson would remonstrate islus-
rice Black's claim in Board of Education v. Allen that:
[T]he only way to protect minority religious groups from
majority groups in this country is to keep the wall of sepa-
ration between church and state high and impregnable as
the First and Fourteenth Amendments provide.'
9 7
Jefferson emphatically declared that protection for minori-
ties came from a different source:
[T]he will of the majority, the natural law of every society,
is the only sure guardian of the rights of man. Perhaps
even this may sometimes err. But its errors are honest, soli-
tary and short-lived.' 9 8
In his First Inaugural Address, he reemphasized this
principle:
[T]hough the will of the majority is in all cases to prevail,
that will to be rightful must be reasonable; that the minor-
ity possess their equal rights which equal law must
protect. '
Despite today's deprecations about the so-called "tyranny of
the majority," majoritarianism is actually the guardian of all the
people's rights. In every case where a constitutional protection
has been established for any minority, whether by race, gender,
social status, or age, each protection was conferred by the con-
sent of the majority of eligible enfranchisees at that time. For
example, it was Anglo males (and a small segment of Free
Blacks) that established the constitutional protections for the
minority group slaves by enacting the Thirteenth, Fourteenth,
and Fifteenth Amendments. That is, slaves received their rights
from the majority consent of non-slaves in three-fourths of the
States. Similarly, the constitutional rights given to the minority
group women in the Nineteenth Amendment were accorded
them by the majority males. In like manner, the constitutional
rights extended to the minority group poor by abolishing the poll
tax in the Twenty-Fourth Amendment came at the insistence of
the non-poll-tax paying majority. Additionally, the Twenty-Sixth
Amendment right giving the minority group eighteen- to twenty-one-
year-olds the right to vote came from voters over the age of twenty-
one that comprised the majority.
197. Allen, 392 U.S. at 254 (Black, J., dissenting).
198. Thomas Jefferson, The Holy Cause of Freedom: Address of Welcome
by the Citizens of Albemarle and Jefferson's Response (Feb. 12, 1790), in 16
THE PAPERS OF THOMASJEFFERSON, supra note 44, at 179.
199. 1 RiCHARDSON, supra note 69, at 322 (Jefferson's First Inaugural
Address, Mar. 11, 1801).
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In other words, all minority rights in the Constitution, and
all explicit protections for minorities, have in all cases been
established by the majority. However, in no case did the majority
cede its own rights; it simply extended them so that both the
majority and the minority might enjoy the same privileges. Fur-
thermore, contrary to what is alleged today, the Bill of Rights was
not enacted to safeguard the minority; rather it was enacted to
safeguard every individual from federal intrusion and
micromanagement.
Regrettably, however, the alleged "tyranny of the majority"
has now been replaced with the actual "tyranny of the minor-
ity"-especially apparent in decisions rendered since the Court's
"psychological coercion test" established in Lee v. Weisman.2 ° ° In
that case challenging commencement prayers, a single family
ostensibly offended by prayer successfully enjoined the rest of the
nation from its constitutional guarantee for the free exercise of
religion. As the dissent noted:
The reader has been told much in this case about the per-
sonal interest of Mr. Weisman and his daughter, and very
little about the personal interests of the other side. They
are not inconsequential .... The narrow context of the
present case involves a community's celebration of one of
the milestones in its young citizen's lives, and it is a bold
step for this Court to seek to banish from that occasion,
and from thousands of similar celebrations throughout this
land, the expression of gratitude to God that a majority of
the community wishes to make.
20 1
Similarly, in Santa Fe Independent School District v. Jane Doe2 °2 a
few students first prevented a community, and then the entire
nation, from enjoying prayers at athletic events; and in Newdow v.
United States Congress2° 3 a single individual stopped students at
schools in nine States from saying "under God" in the Pledge of
Allegiance. Additional examples are legion; but under the
Court's view of the Constitution, dissenting individuals now have
the power of veto over the majority's religious expressions,
thereby allowing one person to deprive the majority of its own
constitutional guarantee for the "free exercise of religion."
Clearly, the Court uses Jefferson's metaphor to reach con-
clusions with which Jefferson would strenuously disagree and
that directly contradict his own beliefs and practices.
200. 505 U.S. 577, 593 (1992).
201. Id. at 645-46 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
202. 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
203. 292 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2002).
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8. The Wrong Image
Jefferson has been used by contemporary courts as the impe-
tus to secularize the public square, and from that secular out-
come certain conclusions have been deduced. For example,
Jefferson is now described in terms that he would dispute-as in
McDaniel v. Paty when the Court declared:
The struggle for separation of church and state in Virginia,
which influenced developments in other States-and in
the Federal Government-was waged by others in addition
to such secular leaders as Jefferson, Madison, and George
Mason 204
In Abington v. Schempp, Justice Brennan similarly asserted:
It has rightly been said of the history of the Establishment
Clause that "our tradition of civil liberty rests not only on
the secularism of a Thomas Jefferson but also on the fer-
vent sectarianism . .. of a Roger Williams."
20 5
Brennan has juxtaposed Jefferson with Roger Williams, por-
traying one as a religionist and the other as a secularist. (Signifi-
cantly, contrary to Brennan's assertion of Roger Williams'
"fervent sectarianism," Williams founded Rhode Island as the
first non-sectarian Colony in America-a Colony in which all
faiths and denominations, and even those who had no religious
beliefs, were welcomed.) Very few individuals fit the categories
of being either a religionist or a secularist.
Nevertheless, according to the Court, Jefferson was a "secu-
lar leader" rather than a "civil leader." This description connotes
a wrong image of Jefferson. This is illustrated by applying the
same adjective to the other Founders. For example, signers of
the Declaration would be "secular leaders" under the Court's
description even though a number of them were ministers of the
Gospel or were involved in Christian ministry: John Witherspoon,
Lyman Hall, Robert Treat Paine, and William Williams all served
in the pulpit; Francis Hopkinson was a church music director
and compiled America's first purely American hymnbook; Dr.
Benjamin Rush founded the Sunday School movement in
America and the first Bible Society; etc. (Similar examples exist
among those who framed the Constitution.) While all of these
individuals were "civil leaders," to describe them as "secular lead-
ers" is misleading. Nonetheless, the Court now uses "secular" as
204. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 629 n.9 (1978).
205. Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 259-60 (1963) (Bren-
nan, J., concurring).
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a synonym for "civil," and vigorously enforces the civil square as
being a secular square.
Yet to many, Jefferson is a "secular leader," for unlike the
overwhelming majority of the other Founders, Jefferson makes
statements that seem to indicate an intolerance toward both
Christianity and the clergy. However, a closer examination ofJef-
ferson's anti-cleric statements reveals that they are not directed
toward all clergy but rather toward Federalist-thinking clergy. (As
a Republican, Jefferson was opposed to autocracy whether in
church or State.) Overlooked or ignored are Jefferson's large
and generous contributions to Christian churches, 20 6 the num-
bers of Christian ministers who praised Jefferson,2 °7 and Jeffer-
son's own letters of praise for numerous clergymen.20 8 In fact, it
was Jefferson who encouraged the lifting of restrictions against
clergy in his own State:
I observe in [the Virginia] constitution an abridgment of
[a] right... I do not approve. It is the incapacitation of a
clergyman from being elected.2 °9
Jefferson was not anti-clergy, only anti-autocratic and anti-
hierarchical clergy. (Recall, too, that in Jefferson's Danbury let-
ter he attacked the Federalist clergy, praised the Baptists, and
then went to church with his Republican pastor friend, the Rev.
John Leland.)
206. See, e.g., THOMAS JEFFERSON, JEFFERSON'S MEMORANDUM BooKs 1154,
1196, 1403 (James A. Bear Jr. & Lucia C. Stanton eds., 1997) (his entry for
March 8, 1824: "I have subscribed to the building of an Episcopalian church,
$200; a Presbyterian do. [ditto], $60; a Baptist do. [ditto], $25"; similar gifts
occurred to other churches on May 15, 1805 and January 6, 1807).
207. See, e.g., BELILES, supra note 58, at 134 (the Rev. John Leland), 139
(the Rev. Samuel Miller); Letter from the Rev.James Madison to ThomasJeffer-
son (Dec. 28, 1786), in 10 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 44, at
644; Letter from Samuel Henley to Thomas Jefferson (July 18, 1785), in 8 THE
PAPERS OF THOMASJEFFERSON, supra note 44, at 304; Letter from Rev. John Todd
to Thomas Jefferson (Aug. 16, 1779), in 3 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON,
supra note 44, at 68-69.
208. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Rev. Mr. Hatch (Dec. 8, 1821),
in 12 THE WORMS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 61, at 212-13; Letter from
ThomasJefferson to the Rev. Samuel Knox (Feb. 12, 1810), in 12 THE WRITINGS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 35, at 361; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to
the Rev. Charles Clay (Jan. 27, 1790), in 8 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON,
supra note 35, at 4; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Mr. Adams about Mr.
Maury (Dec. 20, 1786), in 6 THE WRITINGS OF THOMASJEFFERSON, supra note 35,
at 20; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Preston about the Rev. James
Fontaine (Aug. 18, 1768), in 1 THE PAPERS OF THOMASJEFFERSON, supra note 44,
at 23.
209. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Jeremiah Moor (Aug. 14, 1800), in
9 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 61, at 143.
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Nevertheless, there are instances in Jefferson's writings very
critical of organized religion; but Jefferson provided insight as to
why at one time he was anti-religious and therefore why it is not
surprising to find such statements. Jefferson early had been
enamoured with the writings of anti-religious philosopher
210
David Hume and later confessed:
I remember well the enthusiasm with which I devoured it
[Hume's work] when young, and the length of time, the
research and reflection which were necessary to eradicate
the poison it had instilled into my mind.2 1'
It is not surprising, then, that quotes made by Jefferson
before he had "eradicated Hume's poison" from his mind would
be hostile to religion. Yet these quotes are not reflective of
where he finished his life or of the religious beliefs he held while
President. Jefferson is a secularist only when his quotes are selec-
tively utilized and his actions completely ignored.
Nonetheless, having accepted that Jefferson is a "secular
leader," many therefore pronounce him a deist 212-a statement
Jefferson repudiates; his declaration about his personal faith is
210. Hume himself had declared, "I expected, in entering on my literary
course, that all the Christians ... should be my enemies." Letter from David
Hume to Benjamin Franklin (Feb. 7, 1772), in 5 BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, THE
WORKS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 325-26 (John Bigelow ed., 1904). Most Founders
had little respect for Hume. For example, John Adams called Hume an "athe-
ist, deist, and libertine." 2 JOHN ADAMS, DIARY AND AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF JOHN
ADAMS 391 (L.H. Butterfield ed., 1962) (diary entry of June 23, 1779). James
Madison considered him a "bungling lawgiver" with many of his theories being
"manifestly erroneous." Letter from James Madison to N.P. Trist (Feb. 1830),
in 4 JAMES MADISON, LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 58
(1884);James Madison, Essay on Money, in 4JAMES MADISON, supra, at 464. John
Quincy Adams called him "the Atheist Jacobite." JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, AN ORA-
TION ADDRESSED TO THE CITIZENS OF THE TowN OF QUINCY, ON THE FOURTH OF
JULY, 1831, THE FIFTY-FIFrH ANNIVERSARY OF THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 15 (1831); see also, e.g., Letter from Benjamin Rush to James
Kidd (May 13, 1794), in 2 BENJAMIN RUSH, LETTERS OF BENJAMIN RUSH 748 (L.H.
Butterfield ed., 1951); John Witherspoon, Sermon, The Absolute Necessity of
Salvation Through Christ (Uan. 2, 1758), in 5 JOHN WITHERSPOON, THE WORS
OF JOHN WITHERSPOON 242 (Edinburgh, J. Ogle 1815).
211. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Col. William Duane (Aug. 12,
1810), in 12 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 35, at 405.
212. JOSEPHJ. ELLIS, AMERICAN SPHINX 259 (1997); WILLIAM L. REESE, DIc-
TIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION 360 (1996) ("Thomas Jefferson"); Joy
HAKIM, THE NEW NATION 52 (1993); ROBERT M. HEALEY, JEFFERSON ON RELIGION
IN PUBLIC EDUCATION 26 (1962); ADRIENNE KOCH, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 10 (1957); V.T. THAYER, RELIGION IN PUBLIC EDUCATION 17 (1947);
CHARLES A. BEARD & MARY R. BEARD, THE RISE OF AMERICAN CIVILIZATION 380
(1930).
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succinct. To Secretary of Congress, Charles Thomson, Jefferson
declared:
I am a real Christian, that is to say, a disciple of the doc-
trines of Jesus.
21 3
And to fellow signer of the Declaration, Dr. Benjamin Rush,
he similarly announced:
To the corruptions of Christianity I am indeed opposed;
but not to the genuine precepts of Jesus himself. I am a
Christian in the only sense in which He wished any one to
be; sincerely attached to His doctrines in preference to all
others.
2 14
While Jefferson might fail the standard of being a Christian
by an orthodox definition (on occasion he expressed his doubts
about the divinity of Christ215), there is no evidence to impute
any charge of deism to Jefferson. A deist believes in an imper-
sonal God uninvolved with mankind and embraces the
"clockmaker theory" that there was a God who made the universe
and wound it up like a clock but it now runs of its own volition;
the clockmaker is gone and therefore does not respond to
man. 2 16 None ofJefferson's religious writings from any period of
his life reveal anything less than his strong conviction in a per-
sonal God,217 and that every individual would stand before God
to be judged by Him.2 as
Yet in a further attempt to prove Jefferson's irreligion, it is
alleged that he wrote his own "Bible," cutting out the portions of
Scriptures that he believed were "objectionable" and "unreasona-
ble. '2 19 This derogatory reference to a so-called 'Jefferson Bible"
213. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Charles Thompson (Jan. 9, 1816),
in 14 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 35, at 385.
214. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Dr. Benjamin Rush (Apr. 21, 1803),
in 3 MEMOIR OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 33, at 506.
215. Id.
216. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, 2ND COLLEGE EDITION ("Deism");
see also WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY COLLEGE EDITION (1964) ("Deism").
217. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to David Barrow (May 1,
1815), in 11 THE WORKS OF THOMASJEFERSON, supra note 61, at 471; JEFFERSON,
supra note 80, at 237-38 (Query XVIII); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to
Edward Coles (Aug. 25, 1814), in 11 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra
note 61, at 419-20.
218. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Mrs. John Adams (July 22, 1804), in
11 THE WRITINGS OF THOMASJEFFERSON, supra note 35, at 44; see also Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to Uriah McGregory (Aug. 13, 1800), in 10 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 35, at 171.
219. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGIOUS CONTROVERSIES IN THE UNITED STATES
238 (George H. Shriver & BillJ. Leonard eds., 1997); DICTIONARY OF CHRISTIAN-
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is of recent derivation and there is, in fact, no such single Jeffer-
son work.
Jefferson prepared a religious work in 1804 that he titled The
Philosophy of Jesus of Nazareth Extracted from the Account of His Life
and Doctrines Given by Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John; Being an
Abridgement of the New Testament for the Use of the Indian Unembar-
rassed with Matters of Fact or Faith beyond the Level of Their Comprehen-
sions.22° According to Jefferson, this work for the Indians2 21 was
a "digest of His Jesus'] moral doctrines, extracted in his own
words from the Evangelists, and leaving out everything relative to
his personal history and character." '2 2 2 In essence, this work was
the "red letters" of Jesus cut out of the New Testament and com-
piled into a short pithy work to be read by the Indians.
By 1813, Jefferson had prepared a second work, The Philoso-
phy of Jesus, that he described to John Adams:
We must reduce our volume to the simple evangelists,
select, even from them, the very words only of Jesus....
There will be found remaining the most sublime and
benevolent code of morals which has ever been offered to
man. I have performed this operation for my own use by
cutting verse by verse out of the printed book, and arrang-
ing the matter.... The result is an octavo of forty-six pages,
of pure and unsophisticated doctrines, such as were pro-
fessed and acted on by the unlettered Apostles, the Apostolic
Fathers, and the Christians of the first century.
223
Jefferson also discussed this work with long-time friend
Charles Thompson, telling him:
[I], too, have made a wee-little book . . .which I call the
Philosophy ofJesus; it is a paradigma of His doctrines, made
by cutting the texts out of the book, and arranging them
on the pages of a blank book, in a certain order of time or
subject. A more beautiful or precious morsel of ethics I
have never seen; it is a document in proof that I am a real
Christian, that is to say, a disciple of the doctrines of Jesus,
ITY IN AMERICA 590 (1990) ("Thomas Jefferson"); MARK A. NOLL ET AL., THE
SEARCH FOR CHRISTIAN AMERICA 75 (1989).
220. Judd W. Patton, Introduction to THOMAS JEFFERSON, JEFFERSON'S
"BIBLE": THE LIFE AND MORALS OF JESUS OF NAZARETH XIII (1996) [hereinafter
Introduction to THOMAS JEFFERSON].
221. 3 HENRY S. RANDALL, THE LIFE OF THOMASJEFFERSON 452 n.1 (1858).
222. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Dr. Joseph Priestly (Jan. 29, 1804),
in 10 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 35, at 446.
223. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (Oct. 13, 1813), in 13
THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 35, at 389-90.
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very different from the Platonists who call me infidel and
themselves Christians.
2 24
In 1819, Jefferson prepared a third work titled The Life and
Morals of Jesus of Nazareth.225 This work was for his own use and
was simply an expansion of the shorter one he had compiled for
the Indians. In this version, Jefferson cut the teachings of Jesus
from Bibles in four different languages and placed them parallel,
side by side. As his grandson explained after Jefferson's death:
I now possess (Jefferson's] blank volume, red morocco,
gilt, lettered on the back "The Morals of Jesus" - into
which he pasted extracts in Greek, Latin, French, and
English, taken textually from the four Gospels, and so
arranged that he could run his eye over the readings of the
same verse in four languages .... [H]e was in the habit of
reading nightly from it before going to bed.
22 6
(Significantly, in 1904, this work was reprinted by the federal
government and distributed to Members of CongressZZ7 -a distri-
bution that continued for the next half-century. 228 )
Jefferson often expressed his personal affinity for the teach-
ings ofJesus229 and was not offended by the Bible. He frequently
used its references in his own writings230 and was a financial
backer of the Virginia Bible Society. 231 In fact, during the period
ofJefferson's own economic crisis so extreme that he arranged a
personal loan 232 and offered to sell his library to Congress to
224. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Charles Thompson (Jan. 9, 1816),
in 14 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 35, at 385.
225. THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE LIFE AND MORALS OF JESUS OF NAZARETH
EXTRACTED TEXTUALLY FROM THE GOSPELS IN GREEK, LATIN, FRENCH, AND
ENGLISH (1904).
226. 3 RANDALL, supra note 221, at 671-72.
227. JEFFERSON, supra note 225, at 19.
228. Introduction to JEFFERSON, supra note 220, at xv-xvi.
229. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Dr. Benjamin Waterhouse
(June 26, 1822), in 15 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 35, at
383; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edward Dowse (Apr. 19, 1803), in 10 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 35, at 376-77; Letter from Thomas
Jefferson to James Fishback (Sept. 27, 1809), in 12 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON, supra note 35, at 315; Thomas Jefferson, Syllabus of an Estimate of the
Merit of the Doctrines of Jesus, Compared with Those of Others (Apr. 21, 1803), in 3
MEMOIR OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 33, at 509.
230. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Mrs. John Adams (July 22,
1804), in 11 THE WRITINGS OF THOMASJEFFERSON, supra note 35, at 43-44; Let-
ter from Thomas Jefferson to Edward Coles (Aug. 25, 1814), in 11 THE WORKS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 61, at 419-20.
231. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Greenhow (Jan. 31, 1814),
in 14 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 35, at 81.
232. DUMAS MALONE, THE SAGE OF MONTICELLO 122 (1981).
THE IMAGE AND THE REALITY
raise additional funds to help relieve his own economic dis-
tress,23 3 Jefferson made his very generous contribution 23 4 to the
Virginia Bible Society.
Despite Jefferson's unequivocal acknowledgments of a per-
sonal God, his frequent use of Bible passages, and his support of
a local Bible Society, the belief persists that he was no more than
a deist-a belief exacerbated by the Court's description of him as
a "secular" rather than a "civil" leader. This description by the
Court is misleading but tends to reinforce its policy of disallow-
ing faith in the civil arena.
9. The Wrong Conclusion-A Godless Document
Many believe that the Court's rulings progressively secular-
izing the public square are simply reflective of the secularism
inherent in the Constitution itself. As Justices Brennan and Mar-
shall explained in Marsh v. Chambers:
Even before the First Amendment was written, the Framers
of the Constitution broke with the practice of the Articles
of Confederation and many state constitutions, and did not
invoke the name of God in the document. This "omission
of a reference to the Deity was not inadvertent; nor did it
remain unnoticed."
23 5
The omission of "God" from the Constitution was inten-
tional, but for reasons quite different from those alleged by Bren-
nan and Marshall. The Founders omitted such references for
two reasons.
The first reason was to avoid redundancy. They intended
that the Declaration and the Constitution be inseparable docu-
ments; and since religious values had been instilled in the first,
23 6
233. Id. at 123; see also Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel H. Smith
(Sept. 21, 1814), in 14 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 35, at
190-94.
234. Jefferson's contribution of $50 in his day would represent almost
$500 when converted to today's dollars. See Econ. History Servs., How Much is
That Worth Today?, at http://www.eh.net/hmit/ppowerusd/ (last visited Nov.
16, 2002) (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy);
S. Morgan Friedman, The Inflation Calculator, at http://www.westegg.com/infla-
tion/ (last modified Dec. 11, 2000) (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of
Law, Ethics & Public Policy).
235. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 807 (1983) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
236. As the Supreme Court noted in Holy Trinity Church v. United States.
[T]he Declaration of Independence recognizes the presence of the
Divine in human affairs in these words: "We hold these truths to be
self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by
their Creator with certain unalienable Rights . . . ." "[A]ppealing to
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there was no need to repeat in the second. This designed inter-
relationship was analogous to that between a legal entity's Arti-
cles of Incorporation and its By-Laws. The Articles of
Incorporation call that entity into legal existence and the By-
Laws set forth how it will be governed under its Articles; the By-
Laws must always operate within the framework and purposes set
forth in its Articles and may neither nullify nor supersede them.
That there was the same indissoluble connectedness
between the Declaration and the Constitution was made clear by
John Quincy Adams:
The Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of
the United States are parts of one consistent whole,
founded upon one and the same theory of government.
237
Samuel Adams confirmed:
This Declaration of Independence was received and rati-
fied by all the States in the Union and has never been
disannulled.23 8
So clear was the interdependent relationship between these
two documents that the Supreme Court affirmed:
The latter [the Constitution] is but the body and the letter
of which the former [the Declaration of Independence] is
the thought and the spirit, and it is always safe to read the
letter of the Constitution in the spirit of the Declaration of
Independence.
239
Even today, more than two centuries after its writing, the
Constitution still cannot be properly interpreted or correctly
applied apart from the Declaration. For example, Article I, sec-
tion 5, paragraph 4 of the Constitution is the redress of grievance
4 in the Declaration; 24° Article I, section 4, paragraphs 1 and 2
the Supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude of our intentions
.... " "And for the support of this Declaration, with a firm reliance on
the Protection of Divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other
our Lives, our Fortunes, and our sacred Honor."
143 U.S. 457, 467-68 (1892).
237. JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, THE JUBILEE OF THE CONSTITUTION 40 (1839).
238. Samuel Adams, Address to the Legislature of Massachusetts (Jan. 17,
1794), reprinted in 4 SAMUEL ADAMS, THE WRITINGS OF SAMUEL ADAMS 357 (Harry
Alonzo Cushing ed., 1968) (1908).
239. Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 160 (1897).
240. "He has called together Legislative Bodies at Places unusual, uncom-
fortable, and distant from the Depository of their public Records, for the sole
Purpose of fatiguing them into Compliance with his Measures." THE DECLAA-
TION OF INDEPENDENCE 6 (U.S. 1776).
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are the redress of grievances 5 and 6;24I Article I, section 8, para-
graph 4 is the corollary for grievance 7;242 Article I, section 8,
paragraph 9 for grievance 8;243 and many other such couplets.
2 44
Additional evidence that the two documents are interconnected
and inseparable is found in Article VII of the Constitution,
wherein the Constitution directly attaches itself to the
Declaration:
Done in convention by the unanimous consent of the
States present the seventeenth day of September in the
Year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and eighty
seven, and of the independence of the United States of America the
twelfth. 
245
Furthermore, Presidents date their governmental acts from
the year of the Declaration rather than the year of the Constitu-
tion,24 ' and the admission of territories as States into the United
States was often predicated on an assurance by the State that its
constitution would violate neither the Constitution nor the Dec-
laration.247 In fact, many of the original States included the
entire Declaration of Independence (or lengthy portions
thereof) in the preamble or content of their own constitu-
241. "He has dissolved Representative Houses repeatedly, for opposing
with manly Firmness his Invasions on the Rights of the People. He has refused
for a long Time, after such Dissolutions, to cause others to be elected; whereby
the Legislative Powers, incapable of Annihilation, have returned to the People
at large for their exercise; the State remaining in the mean time exposed to all
the Dangers of Invasion from without, and convulsions within." Id. 7-8.
242. "He has endeavored to prevent the Population of these States; for
that Purpose obstructing the Laws for Naturalization of Foreigners; refusing to
pass others to encourage their Migrations hither, and raising the conditions of
new Appropriations of Lands. Id. 9.
243. "He has obstructed the Administration of Justice, by refusing his
assent to Laws for establishing Judiciary Powers." Id. 10.
244. Other examples include Article I, section 8, clause 12, and Article I,
section 10, clause 3 (addressing grievance 11); Article I, section 8, clause 14
(addressing grievance 12); Article I, section 8, clause 3 (addressing grievance
16); Article I, section 7, clause 1 (addressing grievance 17); Article I, section 8,
clause 10 (addressing grievance 26).
245. U.S. CONST. art. VII.
246. See, e.g., 1 RICHARDSON, supra note 69, at 80 (President George Wash-
ington, Aug. 14, 1790); id. at 249 (President John Adams, July 22, 1797); id. at
357 (President Thomas Jefferson, July 16, 1803); id. at 473 (President James
Madison, Aug. 9, 1809).
247. See, e.g., 34 Stat. 269 (1907) (Oklahoma's enabling act of June 16,
1906); 13 THE STATUTES AT LARGE, TREATIES, AND PROCLAMATIONS OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 48 (George P. Sanger ed., Boston, Little, Brown &
Co. 1866) (Nebraska's enabling act of Apr. 19, 1864); idat 33 (Colorado's ena-
bling act of Mar. 21, 1864); id. at 31 (Nevada's enabling act of Mar. 21, 1864).
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tions, Again demonstrating that the Declaration was insepara-
ble from constitutional government. In short, the Declaration
and the Constitution were viewed as inseparable and interdepen-
dent documents; a violation of the principles of the Declaration
was just as serious as a violation of the provisions of the
Constitution.
The second reason the Founders omitted overt acknowledg-
ments of God in the Constitution was because of federalism. Vir-
tually every State constitution at that time was replete with
religious references, and overt Christian pronouncements are
even found in the constitutions of New Hampshire, 249 Massachu-
setts, 250 NewJersey, 25 1 Pennsylvania,
25 2 Delaware, 25 3 Maryland, 25 4
North Carolina, 255 South Carolina, 256 as well as the Charter of
Rhode Island 2 57 (that governed that State until it adopted its first
constitution in 1842). Since religion was so thoroughly covered
in the State constitutions, and since religion was an issue that had
not been enumerated to the jurisdiction of the federal govern-
ment, the Framers avoided language in the Constitution that
could be construed as displacing, usurping, or superceding the
religious character of the State constitutions.
As the understanding of both federalism and the interde-
pendent relationship between the Declaration and the Constitu-
tion has been widely lost or ignored, many-including Justices
Brennan and Marshall-mistakenly assert that the Founders
placed no explicit moral or religious values into the Constitution.
They are wrong. The Constitution does contain religious
acknowledgments.
RELIGION IN THE CONSTITUTION
The Constitution directly incorporates specifically Christian
phrases and beliefs on two occasions and indirectly on a third.
248. See, e.g., 5 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTION, supra note 94, at
2625-28.
249. THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE SEVERAL INDEPENDENT STATES OF
AMERICA, supra note 91, at 4 (N.H. CONST. of 1783, art. I, § 6 (1783)).
250. Id. at 6-7 (MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. 1, art. I, § 3 (1780)).
251. Id. at 73-74 (N.J. CONST. of 1776, §§ 18-19 (1776)).
252. Id. at 81 (PA. CONST. of 1776, ch. II, § 10 (1776)).
253. Id. at 91, 99-100 (DEL. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, § 3;
CONST. § 22 (1776)).
254. Id. at 107 (MD. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, § 33 (1776)).
255. Id. at 138 (N.C. CONST. of 1776, § 32 (1776)).
256. Id. at 152-54 (S.C. CONST. of 1778, § 38 (1778)).
257. Id. at 37-39, 51-52 (R.I. CHARTER (1663)).
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1. "In the Year of our Lord"
Article VII concludes the Constitution with the declaration:
Done in convention by the unanimous consent of the
States present the seventeenth day of September in the
Year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and eighty
seven ....
The use of the phrase "in the year of our Lord"-acknowl-
edging the reckoning of time based on the birth, life, and death
of Jesus Christ-is a specific recognition of Christianity.
The Constitution could have closed, as did many legislative
documents of that day, simply by citing the year.258 For example,
in the document submitted by each State reporting its ratifica-
tion of the Constitution, several did not use the appellation "in
the Year of our Lord," including Connecticut,25 9 Massachu-
setts,26° Maryland, 261 New Hampshire,262 North Carolina,263 and
Virginia.264  However, Delaware,265  Pennsylvania,266  New
Jersey,2 67 Georgia, 26 8 South Carolina, 2 69 New York,2 70 and Rhode
Island 271 did use that pronouncement. Therefore, although
there was no obligation to do so, the Constitution deliberately
embraced a uniquely Christian rhetoric by including the clause
"in the year of our Lord." As noted by a judge in the Seventh
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals:
From the beginning of the republic, much of the federal
government's symbology has been Christian-down to the dating
of the Constitution itself, which concludes:
Done in Convention by the Unanimous Consent of the
States present the Seventeenth Day of September in the
258. 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 107, at 327 (Virginia Notice of Ratifi-
cation, June 26, 1788).
259. Id. at 321 (Connecticut Notice of Ratification, Jan. 9, 1788).
260. Id. at 323 (Massachusetts Notice of Ratification, Feb. 7, 1788).
261. Id. at 324 (Maryland Notice of Ratification, Apr. 28, 1788).
262. Id. at 325-27 (New Hampshire Notice of Ratification, June 21,
1788).
263. Id. at 333 (North Carolina Notice of Ratification, Nov. 21, 1789).
264. Id. at 327 (Virginia Notice of Ratification, June 26, 1788).
265. Id. at 319 (Delaware Notice of Ratification, Dec. 7, 1787).
266. Id. at 320 (Pennsylvania Notice of Ratification, Dec. 12, 1787).
267. Id. at 321 (New Jersey Notice of Ratification, Dec. 18, 1787).
268. Id. at 324 (Georgia Notice of Ratification, Jan. 2, 1788).
269. Id. at 325 (South Carolina Notice of Ratification, May 23, 1788).
270. Id. at 331 (New York Notice of Ratification, July 26, 1788).
271. Id. at 335 (Rhode Island Notice of Ratification, May 29, 1790).
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Year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and Eighty
seven .... 272
2. "Sundays excepted"
A second clear recognition of Christianity in the Constitu-
tion is the "Sundays excepted" clause. 2 73 Only a generation ago
when Sunday laws (or Blue Laws) were still in effect in most
States, there was a widespread consciousness of the inherently
religious and Christian construction of this clause. This under-
standing had been present since the origin of the Constitution.
In fact, in 1846 when it was argued in one courtroom that Sun-
day laws were a violation of the constitution since they were
based on specific Christian teachings, the response was clear:
Christianity is a part of the common law of the land, with
liberty of conscience to all. It has always been so recog-
nized .... The U. S. Constitution allows it as a part of the
common law. The President is allowed ten days [to sign a
bill], with the exception of Sunday. The Legislature does
not sit, public offices are closed, and the Government rec-
ognizes the day in all things....
The observance of Sunday is one of the usages of the com-
mon law recognized by our U. S. and State Governments.
... Christianity is part and parcel of the common law.
2 7 4
3. The Taking of Oaths
A third incorporation of religious principles into the Consti-
tution is in the provisions regarding oaths.2 75 While today these
272. Am. Jewish Cong. v. City of Chicago, 827 F.2d 120, 129 (7th Cir.
1987) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
273. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
If any bill shall not be returned by the President within ten days (Sun-
days excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the same
shall be a law in like manner as if he had signed it unless the Congress,
by their adjournment, prevent its return, in which case it shall not be a
law.
Id.
274. City Council of Charleston v. Benjamin, 1848 WL 2573, *7-9 (S.C.
App. L.).
275. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 ("The Senate shall have the sole power to
try all impeachments. When sitting for that purpose, they shall be on oath or
affirmation."); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8 ("Before he enter on the execution
of his office, he shall take the following oath or affirmation .... "); U.S. CONST.
art. VI, cl. 3 ("The Senators and Representatives, aforementioned, and the
members of the several State legislatures, and all executive and judicial officers,
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provisions are not considered religious, they definitely were at
the time of the framing-and for generations afterwards.
Supreme Court Justice James Iredell, a ratifier of the U. S. Con-
stitution appointed to the Court by George Washington, noted:
According to the modern definition [1788] of an oath, it is
considered a "solemn appeal to the Supreme Being, for
the truth of what is said, by a person who believes in the
existence of a Supreme Being and in a future state of
rewards and punishments, according to that form which
would bind his conscience most."
2 7 6
Signer of the Constitution Rufus King similarly explained:
[In o]ur laws . . . by the oath which they prescribe, we
appeal to the Supreme Being so to deal with us hereafter as
we observe the obligation of our oaths.
The Pagan world were, and are, without the mighty influ-
ence of this principle, which is proclaimed in the Christian
system-their morals were destitute of its powerful sanc-
tion while their oaths neither awakened the hopes, nor the
fears which a belief in Christianity inspires.
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Signer of the Declaration John Witherspoon confirmed:
An oath is an appeal to God, the Searcher of hearts, for the
truth of what we say and always expresses or supposes an
imprecation of Hisjudgment upon us if we prevaricate. An
oath, therefore, implies a belief in God and His Providence
and indeed is an act of worship .... Persons entering on
public offices are also often obliged to make oath that they
will faithfully execute their trust .... In vows, there is no
party but God and the person himself who makes the
VOW.
2 7 8
In fact, so integral was religion to oaths that George Wash-
ington queried:
[W]here is the security for property, for reputation, for
life, if the sense of religious obligation desert the oaths,
both of the United States and the several States, shall be bound by oath or
affirmation to support this Constitution.").
276. James Iredell, Address (July 30, 1788), in 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra
note 107, at 196 (North Carolina Ratification Debates).
277. Rufus King, Address (Oct. 30, 1821), in REPORTS OF THE PROCEED-
INGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION OF 1821, ASSEMBLED FOR THE PURPOSE OF
AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 575 (1821).
278. 7JOHN WITHERSPOON, supra note 210, at 139-40, 142 ("Lectures on
Moral Philosophy," Lecture 16 of Oaths and Vows).
2003]
456 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 17
which are the instruments of investigation in Courts of
Justice?
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Courts also recognized that the taking of oaths-particularly
those by a witness in the courtroom with a hand upon a Bible-
was a clear recognition of Christianity. As explained by one early
court:
In the Courts over which we preside, we daily acknowledge
Christianity as the most solemn part of our administration.
A Christian witness, having no religious scruples against
placing his hand upon the book, is sworn upon the holy
Evangelists-the books of the New Testament, which testify
of our Savior's birth, life, death, and resurrection; this is so
common a matter that it is little thought of as an evidence
of the part which Christianity has in the common law.
28 0
(Numerous early constitutional experts confirm that an oath
was inseparable from a religious belief.2 1 )
Clearly, the Constitution is not a religion-free document; it
contains three clauses that specifically give it not only a religious
but also a specifically Christian construction. The Constitution
now seems religion-free only because in recent years the Court
first invalidated the religious construction of constitutional
clauses and then construed the Constitution to be independent
of the Declaration.
CONCLUSION
Over recent decades there has been a steady succession of
religious practices halted by the Court under Jefferson's author-
ity; but why did Jefferson never once speak out against the prac-
tices that he is now used to proscribe?
279. WASHINGTON, supra note 131, at 23.
280. City Council of Charleston v. Benjamin, 1848 WL 2573 *11 (S.C.
App. L.).
281. See, e.g., MEMOIRS AND LETTERS OF JAMES KENT, LL.D. 164 (William
Kent ed., Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1898); 2JOSEPH STORY, LIFE AND LErERS
OF JOSEPH STORY 8-9 (William W. Story ed., 1851); 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE,
THE REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND ITS POLITICAL INSTITU-
TIONS, REVIEWED AND EXAMINED 334 (Henry Reeves trans., N.Y., A.S. Barnes &
Co. 1851); DANIEL WEBSTER, MR. WEBSTER'S SPEECH IN DEFENSE OF THE CHRIS-
TIAN MINISTRY AND IN FAVOR OF THE RELIGIOUS INSTRUCTION OF THE YOUNG,
DELIVERED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, FEBRUARY 20, 1844, IN
THE CASE OF STEPHEN GIRARD'S WILL 43, 51 (D.C., Gales & Seaton 1844);JAMES
COFFIELD MITCHELL, THE TENNESSEE JUSTICE'S MANUAL AND CIVIL OFFICER'S
GUIDE 457-58 (Nashville, J.C. Mitchell & C.C. Norvell 1834); 2 ZEPHANIAH
SWIFT, A SYSTEM OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 238 (Windham,
John Byrne, 1796).
THE IMAGE AND THE REALI7T
Consider how long specific religious practices were deemed
to be constitutional by civil authorities until finally disallowed by
contemporary courts using the name of Jefferson:
" Requiring a belief in God to hold public office (158 years,
from 1789 to 1961);
" Holding organized prayer in public schools to begin each
school day (160 years, from 1789 to 1962);
" Conducting organized Bible reading to begin public
school days (161 years, from 1789 to 1963);
" Teaching students about a Creator in public education
(164 years, from 1789 to 1966);
" Posting the Ten Commandments in public buildings (178
years, from 1789 to 1980);
" Displaying nativity scenes in government structures (187
years, from 1789 to 1989); and
" Allowing adults to offer invocations and benedictions at
school functions (190 years, from 1789 to 1992).
The Court has halted such long-standing religious practices,
including many established by signers of the Constitution,
because it has made numerous historical errors concerning Jef-
ferson, including:
" Applying Jefferson's "wall of separation" to the Establish-
ment Clause rather than the Free Exercise Clause;
" Using Virginia as the national prototype in obtaining
religious liberty and achieving disestablishment when it
was not;
" Establishing Jefferson as its principal expert when he had
no direct role in the framing of the Bill of Rights or the
Constitution;
* Interpreting Jefferson's metaphor as a fixed, rigid, inflexi-
ble bulwark against religious expressions in the public
square;
" Disregarding Jefferson's pertinent statements about spe-
cific issues before the Court;
" Subjugating explicit constitutional language to a general
figure of speech;
* Claiming Jefferson intended to prevent religion from
being the subject of legislation and to isolate it from tax-
payer expense;
* Describing Jefferson as a leader in secularism; and
* Asserting that the Constitution was deliberately designed
as a secular, godless document.
These errors in historical fact have led to outcomes the
opposite of those intended and practiced by Jefferson himself,
demonstrating that bad history does indeed result in bad public
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policy. Furthermore, the Court's discriminating use of Jeffer-
son's words and actions intimate that he is used more as an
excuse for, rather than a cause of, the Court's rulings.
The fact that much of the Court's current Establishment
Clause jurisprudence is constructed upon a faulty historical foun-
dation was succinctly documented by Chief Justice Rehnquist
who-unlike so many other Justices-has demonstrated a com-
plete aversion to picking and choosing select historical examples
to buttress his dispositions. In fact, his dissent in Wallace v. Jaf-
free282 is perhaps the most comprehensive historical examination
conducted by any Justice in any decision of the Supreme Court.
In his impressive history-laden opinion, Rehnquist first presented
twenty-four pages of First Amendment history chronicling the
words and actions of several of its framers and then concluded
with a barbed indictment of the Court's historical mistakes and
its abuse of Jefferson:
It is impossible to build sound constitutional doctrine
upon a mistaken understanding of constitutional history,
but unfortunately the Establishment Clause has been
expressly freighted with Jefferson's misleading metaphor
for nearly 40 years. Thomas Jefferson was of course in
France at the time the constitutional Amendments known
as the Bill of Rights were passed by Congress and ratified
by the states. His letter to the Danbury Baptist Association
was a short note of courtesy, written 14 years after the
Amendments were passed by Congress. He would seem to
any detached observer as a less than ideal source of con-
temporary history as to the meaning of the Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment.
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Rehnquist therefore concluded:
Whether due to its lack of historical support or its practical
unworkability, the Everson "wall" has proved all but useless
as a guide to sound constitutional adjudication. It illus-
trates only too well the wisdom of Benjamin Cardozo's
observation that "[m]etaphors in law are to be narrowly
watched, for starting as devices to liberate thought, they
end often by enslaving it."
But the greatest injury of the "wall" notion is its mischievous
diversion of judges from the actual intentions of the drafters of
the Bill of Rights. The "crucible of litigation," is well adapted to
adjudicating factual disputes on the basis of testimony presented
282. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91-114 (1985) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
283. Id. at 92.
THE IMAGE AND THE REAJITY
in court, but no amount of repetition of historical errors in judi-
cial opinions can make the errors true. The "wall of separation
between church and State" is a metaphor based on bad history, a
metaphor which has proved useless as a guide to judging. It
should be frankly and explicitly abandoned.
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284. Id. at 107 (quoting Berkey v. Third Avenue R. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 61
(1926)) (citations omitted).
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